A vulnerability was discovered in Samba, where the flaw allows SMB clients to truncate files, even with read-only permissions when the Samba VFS module "acl_xattr" is configured with "acl_xattr:ignore system acls = yes". The SMB protocol allows opening files when the client requests read-only access but then implicitly truncates the opened file to 0 bytes if the client specifies a separate OVERWRITE create disposition request. The issue arises in configurations that bypass kernel file system permissions checks, relying solely on Samba's permissions.

A design flaw was found in Samba's DirSync control implementation, which exposes passwords and secrets in Active Directory to privileged users and Read-Only Domain Controllers (RODCs). This flaw allows RODCs and users possessing the GET_CHANGES right to access all attributes, including sensitive secrets and passwords. Even in a default setup, RODC DC accounts, which should only replicate some passwords, can gain access to all domain secrets, including the vital krbtgt, effectively eliminating the RODC / DC distinction. Furthermore, the vulnerability fails to account for error conditions (fail open), like out-of-memory situations, potentially granting access to secret attributes, even under low-privileged attacker influence.

A flaw was found in Samba. It is susceptible to a vulnerability where multiple incompatible RPC listeners can be initiated, causing disruptions in the AD DC service. When Samba's RPC server experiences a high load or unresponsiveness, servers intended for non-AD DC purposes (for example, NT4-emulation "classic DCs") can erroneously start and compete for the same unix domain sockets. This issue leads to partial query responses from the AD DC, causing issues such as "The procedure number is out of range" when using tools like Active Directory Users. This flaw allows an attacker to disrupt AD DC services.

A path traversal vulnerability was identified in Samba when processing client pipe names connecting to Unix domain sockets within a private directory. Samba typically uses this mechanism to connect SMB clients to remote procedure call (RPC) services like SAMR LSA or SPOOLSS, which Samba initiates on demand. However, due to inadequate sanitization of incoming client pipe names, allowing a client to send a pipe name containing Unix directory traversal characters (../). This could result in SMB clients connecting as root to Unix domain sockets outside the private directory. If an attacker or client managed to send a pipe name resolving to an external service using an existing Unix domain socket, it could potentially lead to unauthorized access to the service and consequential adverse events, including compromise or service crashes.