7.1 HIGH
- CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
- Attack Vector (AV): Network (N)
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
- Privileges Required (PR): Low (L)
- User Interaction (UI): None (N)
- Scope (S): Unchanged (U)
- Confidentiality (C): Low (L)
- Integrity (I): High (H)
- Availability (A): None (N)
- Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Network (N)
- Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): Low (L)
- Modified Privileges Required (MPR): Low (L)
- Modified User Interaction (MUI): None (N)
- Modified Confidentiality (MC): Low (L)
- Modified Scope (MS): Unchanged (U)
- Modified Integrity (MI): High (H)
- Modified Availability (MA): None (N)
Activity log
- Created suggestion
Subsonic API: any authenticated user can delete or read any other user's playlist (IDOR)
gonic is a music streaming server / free-software subsonic server API implementation. Prior to version 0.21.0, the Subsonic API endpoints `/rest/deletePlaylist.view` and `/rest/getPlaylist.view` perform no per-resource authorization. Once authenticated as any user (admin or not), an attacker can delete any playlist owned by any other user (including admin) by passing its `id` and read the full contents (name, comment, song list) of any other user's **private** (non-public) playlist by passing its `id`. The Subsonic playlist `id` is `base64url("<userID>/<filename>.m3u")`. Because filenames are user-supplied or time-derived and the `userID` is a small integer, IDs are guessable and frequently exposed (e.g. a previously-public playlist that was later made private still has the same ID). This breaks the multi-user trust boundary of gonic: a low-privileged user can wipe an administrator's curated playlists, and a user can exfiltrate any private playlist they obtain an ID for. The issue was fixed in commit `6dd71e6a3c966867ef8c900d359a7df75789f410`, which is part of version 0.21.0.
References
-
https://github.com/sentriz/gonic/security/advisories/GHSA-hmgp-w9jm-vp95 x_refsource_CONFIRM
-
https://github.com/sentriz/gonic/commit/6dd71e6 x_refsource_MISC
Affected products
- ==< 0.21.0
Package maintainers
-
@autrimpo Michal Koutenský <michal@koutensky.net>