OPNsense before 26.1.9 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers to inject arbitrary HTML or JavaScript by embedding payloads in the certificate description field via the trust certificate API. The unsanitized description value is persisted and later rendered in the Dashboard Certificates widget through Certificates.js, which interpolates the raw value into HTML attribute and text content sinks without encoding, causing injected scripts to execute in the browser of any authenticated user who views the Dashboard, enabling session hijacking or credential theft.

Guzzle is an extensible PHP HTTP client. Prior to 7.15.2 and 8.0.1, SetCookie::matchesDomain() gives every subdomain of a cookie Domain that cookie unless SetCookie::matchesDomain() recognizes the Domain as an IP literal or a numeric host, and the decision comes from the domain's own text, so two spellings a transport reads as an address keep subdomain scope. Hexadecimal and mixed-base forms such as 0x7f000001 and 0177.0.0.0x1 go unrecognized while libcurl 8.21.0 reads both as 127.0.0.1. A percent-escaped Domain keeps that scope on both branches because percent-decoding sits above numeric parsing, so 192.168.0.%31 and 127.0.0.1%2e are registered names in the URI grammar rather than address literals, and no numeric rule in any base classifies them, while libcurl decodes the host before resolving and reads them as 192.168.0.1 and 127.0.0.1. A cookie stored for Domain=0x7f000001 is placed in the Cookie header of a request to evil.0x7f000001, disclosing a session identifier or token to a host that is not that address, and a response from evil.0x7f000001 setting Domain=0x7f000001 is accepted into the jar and replayed to the address, so a server answering for the look-alike name can fix a session or set application state. Exploitation requires the application to enable cookie support, address an origin by one of these spellings, and contact a host whose name ends in that spelling. This issue is fixed in versions 7.15.2 and 8.0.1.

OpenWrt luci-app-bmx7 before commit 5890760a454dad2cb00389dba2cdc5e779e0ffdd contains a path traversal vulnerability in the bmx7-info CGI script that allows unauthenticated attackers to read files outside the configured runtimeDir. Attackers can supply directory traversal sequences in the query string to escape the intended directory and read sensitive files accessible to the CGI process.

Emlog Pro through 2.6.23 contains a disabled TLS certificate validation vulnerability in include/service/ai.php that allows network-adjacent attackers to intercept outbound HTTPS requests to configured LLM providers by presenting arbitrary TLS certificates, as CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER and CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST are unconditionally disabled across sendStream(), sendImageRequest(), send(), and fetchSearchHtml() with no option to re-enable verification. Attackers can perform man-in-the-middle interception to extract Authorization Bearer API keys from every AI request and inject crafted AI responses that may be acted upon by the tool-call execution pipeline, including the query_database and update_config tool handlers.

OPNsense before 26.1.9 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows authenticated attackers with firewall rule management privileges to inject arbitrary HTML or JavaScript by embedding payloads in the firewall rule description field via the filter API endpoint. The unsanitized description value is persisted and later rendered through the default cell formatter in opnsense_bootgrid.js, which assigns raw cell content to innerHTML, causing injected scripts to execute in the browser of any authenticated user who views the Firewall Rules page, enabling session hijacking or credential theft.

Guzzle is an extensible PHP HTTP client. Prior to 7.15.2 and 8.0.1, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the Host header separately. The cURL handlers set CURLOPT_URL to the URI exactly as written and push that Host into CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER; StreamHandler does the same through fopen(). libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy CONNECT, while the supplied Host suppresses the aligned one libcurl would have generated. For a URI host written as 127.0.0.%31, filter_var() rejects the host as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to 127.0.0.1 and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives Host: 127.0.0.%31. An attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever the host exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: no_proxy selects proxy routing from the literal host, and RedirectMiddleware decides from it whether to strip Authorization and Cookie. Exploitation requires the application to build a request URI from untrusted input and to make a host decision before handing it to Guzzle. This issue is fixed in versions 7.15.2 and 8.0.1.

The hawkBit device management client in subsys/mgmt/hawkbit accumulates the body of an HTTP response from the update server into a heap buffer in response_json_cb() (subsys/mgmt/hawkbit/hawkbit.c). The buffer is sized to hold the received body bytes but reserves no space for a terminating NUL. When the full response has arrived, the code writes response_data[downloaded_size] = '\0' — and whenever the accumulated body length equals the allocation, that terminator lands one byte past the end of the heap object (a heap-based out-of-bounds write, CWE-122 / CWE-787). The body length and fragmentation are taken directly from the parsed HTTP response (rsp->body_frag_start / rsp->body_frag_len) and are fully controlled by the remote hawkBit server, which chooses its own response length. The precise trigger depends on how the buffer grows, and both forms are remotely reachable. Since v4.0.0 the reallocation is sized to exactly downloaded_size + body_len, so any response body larger than the 1100-byte initial buffer makes the out-of-bounds write deterministic; such response sizes are normal for hawkBit deployment metadata. Before v4.0.0 the buffer grew by doubling and the growth check ((downloaded_size + body_len) > response_buffer_size) is false at equality, so a response body whose length is exactly the current allocation — 1100 bytes with the default initial buffer — skips the reallocation entirely and writes the terminator at response_data[1100] of an 1100-byte object. The HTTP length-mismatch check does not catch this, because the declared and received lengths genuinely agree. Either form is reachable by a malicious, compromised, or man-in-the-middle update server (TLS is optional and, when enabled, does not protect against a hostile server), with no authentication of response content and no client-side length cap protecting the write. The out-of-bounds write is a fixed single NUL byte immediately following the allocation, corrupting adjacent allocator metadata or the next allocation. The practical impact is heap corruption leading to denial of service (fault on a subsequent allocation or free), with the bounded, allocator-dependent possibility of further corruption. The fix sizes the buffer to the body length plus one and copies with memcpy, ensuring the terminator always lands within the allocation.

The Link Library WordPress plugin before 7.9.3 does not properly sanitise and escape a user-supplied value before using it in a SQL query, allowing unauthenticated users to perform SQL injection attacks.

A weakness has been identified in GL.iNet GL-MT3000 up to 4.4.5. This issue affects the function remove_profile of the file /cgi-bin/glc of the component modem.so. This manipulation causes command injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure and confirmed the existence of the vulnerability.

Socket.IO enables bidirectional and low-latency communication for every platform. Prior to 4.2.7, 3.4.5, and 3.3.6, a specially crafted Socket.IO packet can make the server wait for a large number of binary attachments and buffer them, which can be exploited to make the server run out of memory. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.7, 3.4.5, and 3.3.6.