OpenClaw Discord versions before 2026.7.1 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in guild metadata read actions that allows lower-trust senders to retrieve information excluded by channel allowlists. Attackers can bypass the configured Discord read-target policy to access guild metadata from servers or channels outside the operator's allowlist.

OpenClaw's Matrix integration (npm package @openclaw/matrix) versions >= 2026.2.2 and < 2026.8.1 lowercase complete Matrix user IDs — including historical localparts and the case-sensitive server-name portion — when deriving the OpenClaw authorization identity. As a result, distinct authenticated Matrix accounts can normalize to the same authorization identity. A Matrix participant controlling a colliding account identifier (a protocol-valid identifier that differs from the configured one only by characters OpenClaw case/Unicode folds; display-name matching is not required) can inherit allowlist, owner-command, exec-approval, or plugin-approval authority configured for another account. The issue is fixed in 2026.8.1.

OpenClaw's Discord integration (npm package @openclaw/discord) before version 2026.9.3 could lose the sender-scoped media policy in the emoji and sticker upload actions before loading a local file. A sender permitted to invoke those actions could cause OpenClaw to read a host path that the same sender's configured media roots would otherwise reject, placing bytes from an out-of-policy local file into an outbound emoji or sticker upload. Exploitation requires access to the guild asset action and knowledge or derivation of a useful local path; the issue does not permit unrestricted filesystem browsing or code execution. The issue is fixed in @openclaw/discord 2026.9.3.