OpenClaw Discord versions before 2026.7.1 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in guild metadata read actions that allows lower-trust senders to retrieve information excluded by channel allowlists. Attackers can bypass the configured Discord read-target policy to access guild metadata from servers or channels outside the operator's allowlist.

OpenClaw's Discord integration (npm package @openclaw/discord) before version 2026.9.3 could lose the sender-scoped media policy in the emoji and sticker upload actions before loading a local file. A sender permitted to invoke those actions could cause OpenClaw to read a host path that the same sender's configured media roots would otherwise reject, placing bytes from an out-of-policy local file into an outbound emoji or sticker upload. Exploitation requires access to the guild asset action and knowledge or derivation of a useful local path; the issue does not permit unrestricted filesystem browsing or code execution. The issue is fixed in @openclaw/discord 2026.9.3.

A weakness has been identified in songxinjianqwe Chat up to ac63d25297079eed5e4ba7e88d3b7a032637150d. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file chat-server/src/main/java/cn/sinjinsong/chat/server/ChatServer.java of the component chat-server. This manipulation causes server-side request forgery. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. This product uses a rolling release model to deliver continuous updates. As a result, specific version information for affected or updated releases is not available. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

DiscordChatExporter saves Discord chat logs to a file. Prior to 2.47.2, HTML exports generated with markdown formatting disabled pass attacker-controlled content through FormatMarkdownAsync and FormatEmbedMarkdownAsync in DiscordChatExporter.Core/Exporting/MessageGroupTemplate.cshtml and render it without HTML entity encoding. The affected fields include message.Content, message.ForwardedMessage.Content, message.ReferencedMessage.Content, embed.Title, embed.Description, field.Name, and field.Value. A Discord webhook or bot can store a script payload in these fields, and the payload executes when a user exports the channel with markdown formatting disabled and opens the resulting HTML, allowing the script to read the export or alter its displayed content. This issue is fixed in version 2.47.2.

DiscordChatExporter saves Discord chat logs to a file. Prior to 2.47.2, the VisitEmojiAsync method in DiscordChatExporter.Core/Exporting/HtmlMarkdownVisitor.cs interpolates emoji.Name into the alt attribute and emoji.Code into the title attribute without HTML entity encoding. This affects HTML exports regardless of the markdown setting. Discord's current custom emoji name validation normally excludes attribute-breaking characters, but tampered offline input, a relaxed upstream validation rule, or another future metadata source can inject an HTML attribute and execute script when a user opens the export. This issue is fixed in version 2.47.2.