OpenClaw's Matrix integration (npm package @openclaw/matrix) versions >= 2026.2.2 and < 2026.8.1 lowercase complete Matrix user IDs — including historical localparts and the case-sensitive server-name portion — when deriving the OpenClaw authorization identity. As a result, distinct authenticated Matrix accounts can normalize to the same authorization identity. A Matrix participant controlling a colliding account identifier (a protocol-valid identifier that differs from the configured one only by characters OpenClaw case/Unicode folds; display-name matching is not required) can inherit allowlist, owner-command, exec-approval, or plugin-approval authority configured for another account. The issue is fixed in 2026.8.1.

Dendrite through 0.13.8 contains an improper authorization vulnerability in the Matrix Client-Server API that allows any authenticated local user to delete third-party identifier bindings belonging to other users by submitting an arbitrary address and medium to the account deletion endpoint without ownership verification. Attackers can exploit the unverified Forget3PID handler to remove a victim's email or MSISDN binding and subsequently rebind the address through an identity server to hijack the victim's password reset flow.

Dendrite through 0.13.8 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to cause the server to open outbound TLS connections to arbitrary hosts and ports by supplying an unvalidated serverName parameter to the legacy media download endpoint. Attackers can exploit distinguishable error response classes and leaked internal IP addresses in error messages to perform blind port scanning and enumerate internal network topology.

Dendrite through 0.13.8 contains an improper access control vulnerability in the syncapi /context endpoint (syncapi/routing/context.go) that allows authenticated local users to access post-leave room state events by exploiting a flawed membership check that evaluates only the RoomExists field while ignoring IsInRoom, HasBeenInRoom, and Membership fields. Attackers who have left a room can call the rooms context API endpoint for a previously permitted event and receive unfiltered current room state that the /messages and /sync endpoints correctly withhold.