A flaw was found in libsoup's SoupServer HTTP Range header processing. The sort_ranges() comparator in soup-message-headers.c truncates a 64-bit subtraction result to 32-bit int, flipping the sign for range offsets differing by more than INT_MAX. This causes silent omission of requested byte ranges from HTTP 206 Partial Content responses on resources larger than approximately 2 GB.

The 'podman quadlet install --replace' command opens the existing destination file with O_CREATE|O_WRONLY but omits O_TRUNC. When the initial reflink copy attempt fails (common on non-reflink-capable filesystems including many RHEL default XFS configurations), the fallback in ReflinkOrCopy uses io.Copy which performs a non-truncating write. If the original Quadlet is larger than the new Quadlet, the file is not truncated and content from the original is preserved. The command completes with no warning. There is no risk of information leakage as the user already had access to the Quadlet in order to replace it, and in most cases, this would only lead to invalid Quadlet files. However, security-related options from the end of the old Quadlet could be included in the new Quadlet, and if the truncation resulted in a valid Quadlet file, this could result in undesirable behavior. For example, running podman quadlet install --replace to remove a single line from the end of a Quadlet - including security-sensitive content, like AddCapability - will fail, and the option will continue to be used. Further, with Volume Quadlets, this can include additional mounts which can cause content to be unintentionally exposed into containers. If, later, the image is updated then compromised content might be leaked to an attacker. The vulnerable code paths are in pkg/domain/infra/abi/quadlet.go (lines 338-360, O_CREATE|O_WRONLY without O_TRUNC) and vendor/go.podman.io/storage/pkg/fileutils/reflink_linux.go (lines 12-19, non-truncating io.Copy fallback).

Podman is a tool for managing OCI containers and pods. From 1.8.1 until 5.8.4, a container image that contains a environment variable with just a key and no value can trick podman into passing that variable from the host into the container. This is made worse by the fact that using an asterisk (*) will cause podman to pass all host variables into the container. So essentially a malicious image can exfiltrate all podman environment variables that are set in the session from where the container is launched. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.8.4 and 6.0.0.

Podman is a tool for managing OCI containers and pods. From 3.0.0 until 5.7.1, running a malicious container image where the WORKDIR path contains a symlink can create a directory or modify ownership on the host filesystem. Modified ownership is less likely to happen as that requires help from an untrusted/malicious process that mutates the host filesystem tree during dereferencing of the WORKDIR path, to trigger a race condition. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.7.1.

Podman is a tool for managing OCI containers and pods. Versions 4.8.0 through 5.8.1 contain a command injection vulnerability in the HyperV machine backend in pkg/machine/hyperv/stubber.go, where the VM image path is inserted into a PowerShell double-quoted string without sanitization, allowing $() subexpression injection. Because PowerShell evaluates subexpressions inside double-quoted strings before executing the outer command, an attacker who can control the VM image path through a crafted machine name or image directory can execute arbitrary PowerShell commands with the privileges of the Podman process. On typical Windows installations this means SYSTEM-level code execution, and only Windows is affected as the code is exclusive to the HyperV backend. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.2.

A flaw was found in Podman. In a Containerfile or Podman, data written to RUN --mount=type=bind mounts during the podman build is not discarded. This issue can lead to files created within the container appearing in the temporary build context directory on the host, leaving the created files accessible.