n8n is a workflow automation platform. In n8n versions before 1.123.76, 2.37.7, and 2.38.2, the source control push endpoint derived the set of files to push from the file paths and status supplied in the client request payload instead of from the server-side status computed for the requesting user. An authenticated project-scoped user (e.g., a project admin) could therefore reference files belonging to projects they have no access to and push a deletion of those projects' workflows and credentials, resulting in cross-project data destruction. Exploitation requires the Source Control (Environments) enterprise feature to be licensed, enabled, and connected to a remote repository. The issue is fixed in 1.123.76, 2.37.7, and 2.38.2.

Harbor through 2.15.2 fails to properly restrict the q query parameter filtering on scanner registration access credentials. Project administrators can exploit fuzzy filtering on the AccessCredential column to recover the scanner adapter secret one character at a time through response row counts.

GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 18.4.6 before 19.1.8, 19.2 before 19.2.6, and 19.3 before 19.3.2 that under certain conditions could have allowed an unauthenticated user to cause denial of service due to improper resource allocation limits in the GraphQL complexity calculation logic.

GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 13.0 before 19.1.8, 19.2 before 19.2.6, and 19.3 before 19.3.2 that under certain conditions could have allowed an authenticated user to prevent another user from modifying their group settings due to improper validation of group URL slugs during namespace transfers.

djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, djust's per-object authorization (`get_object` + `has_object_permission`, ADR-017) was enforced on the WebSocket mount and event paths but not on three other render entry points: (a) the initial HTTP GET render, (b) SPA `url_change` navigation, and (c) `{% live_render %}` embedded child views. An authenticated user could therefore view (and on some paths act on) an object they are not authorized for by loading the page directly, navigating to it via SPA url-change, or composing it as an embedded child — a classic IDOR / broken object-level access control on object-scoped views. This is fixed in djust 1.0.7. All render entry points now route through a shared `enforce_object_permission` chokepoint: HTTP GET returns 403, `url_change` emits a `permission_denied` frame and skips the render, and `{% live_render %}` (eager + lazy) refuses the embed. Views without a custom `get_object` are unaffected (no-op). No reliable workaround short of upgrading. Do not expose object-scoped views through the HTTP-GET / url_change / live_render paths until patched.

djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, `djust.tenants` isolation was enforced only on the HTTP path. The current tenant was stored in `threading.local()` and set exclusively by the HTTP-only `TenantMiddleware`, so on the live (WebSocket/SSE) path `get_current_tenant()` was always `None` during mount and every event handler — and the tenant-aware `QuerySet` manager failed OPEN (returned the unfiltered queryset, ignoring `STRICT_MODE`), disclosing every tenant's rows to whoever held the socket. `threading.local` was additionally shared across connections on the `sync_to_async` executor thread. This issue is fixed in djust 1.0.7. Tenant storage moved to a `contextvars.ContextVar` (per async task); the resolved tenant is bound around WS/SSE mount and every dispatch; both managers scope the base queryset once and fail CLOSED (`.none()` under the default `STRICT_MODE`); and system check S006 warns when `STRICT_MODE=False`. No known workarounds are available on the live path.

djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, the SSE client→server POST endpoints are `@csrf_exempt` and the SSE GET stream endpoint had no Origin check, so a cross-origin page could drive a victim-cookie-authenticated SSE session: force the victim's browser to GET the stream URL (which creates and mounts a LiveView as the victim) and POST to the message endpoint with `credentials: include` to fire state-changing event handlers as the victim. The URL `session_id` is client-chosen (validated only for UUID *format*), so it is not a CSRF token, and a JSON body sent as `text/plain` is a CORS simple request with no preflight. The issue is fixed in 1.0.7. All three SSE endpoints validate the request `Origin` against `ALLOWED_HOSTS` (mirroring the WebSocket CSWSH defense) and reject cross-origin requests with 403; the POST endpoints additionally require `Content-Type: application/json` (415 otherwise), closing the `text/plain` simple-request bypass. As a workaround, disable the SSE transport, or front it with a proxy that enforces an Origin allowlist.

GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 15.3 before 19.1.8, 19.2 before 19.2.6, and 19.3 before 19.3.2 that, under certain conditions, an authenticated user could have induced a targeted user to perform unintended state-changing HTTP requests due to improper sanitization of user-controlled data in the Markdown JSON table renderer.

Use of Cache Containing Sensitive Information in ZenHive mpp allows a shared HTTP cache to store a paid response and serve it to clients that never paid. MPP.Plug.verify_credential in lib/mpp/plug.ex sets payment-receipt and cache-control: private on the connection before the wrapped application runs, and registers no register_before_send/2 callback. Plug.Conn.put_resp_header/3 replaces an existing header, so a mounting application that sets its own cache-control on the paid resource (for example public, max-age=3600) silently overrides the private the library relies on, and a CDN or reverse proxy can then store the paid 200 together with its Payment-Receipt and serve both to unpaid clients. The library-level guarantee is therefore defeatable by the application it protects. For the same reason a downstream non-2xx response still carried Payment-Receipt, issuing a receipt for a response that delivered no resource. This issue affects mpp: from 0.1.0 before 0.16.2.

LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. Prior to 1.83.9, an authenticated LiteLLM Proxy caller with a valid virtual key can place api_base inside the user_config request body to bypass is_request_body_safe, which blocks top-level api_base and base_url but previously did not inspect or reject user_config. Because user_config constructs the outbound router, the nested destination redirects a server-side request to an internal or external host selected by the caller and can expose endpoints the caller cannot otherwise access. This issue is fixed in version 1.83.9.