7.8 HIGH
- CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
- Attack Vector (AV): Local (L)
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
- Privileges Required (PR): Low (L)
- User Interaction (UI): None (N)
- Scope (S): Unchanged (U)
- Confidentiality (C): High (H)
- Integrity (I): High (H)
- Availability (A): High (H)
- Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Local (L)
- Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): Low (L)
- Modified Privileges Required (MPR): Low (L)
- Modified User Interaction (MUI): None (N)
- Modified Confidentiality (MC): High (H)
- Modified Scope (MS): Unchanged (U)
- Modified Integrity (MI): High (H)
- Modified Availability (MA): High (H)
Activity log
- Created & dismissed (max. allowed matches exceeded) suggestion
xfrm: iptfs: reset runtime state when cloning SAs
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: iptfs: reset runtime state when cloning SAs iptfs_clone_state() clones the IPTFS mode data with kmemdup(). This copies runtime objects which must not be shared with the original SA, including the embedded sk_buff_head, hrtimers, spinlock, and in-flight reassembly/reorder state. If xfrm_state_migrate() fails after clone_state() but before the later init_state() call has reinitialized those fields, the cloned state can be destroyed by xfrm_state_gc_task() with list and timer state copied from the original SA. With queued packets this lets the clone splice and free skbs owned by the original IPTFS queue, leading to use-after-free and double-free reports in iptfs_destroy_state() and skb release paths. Reinitialize the clone's runtime state before publishing it through x->mode_data. Because clone_state() now publishes a destroyable mode_data object before init_state(), take the mode callback module reference there. Avoid taking it again from __iptfs_init_state() for the same object.
References
Affected products
- <6.14
- <7f83d174073234839aea176f265e517e0d50a1d2
- =<6.18.*
- =<7.0.*
- <9327252e04626d4bb02ca8c0c108fbe8eabf0c5a
- =<*
- <dfb9f6cbfa9826655a49698cf90eb800fce2178e
- ==6.14