In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix broken rx after throttle If the port is closed while throttled, the read urb is never resubmitted and the port will not receive any further data until the device is reconnected (or the driver is rebound). Clear the throttle flags and submit the urb if needed when opening the port.

OpenRemote before 1.26.2 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the console registration API that allows unauthenticated attackers to update existing console assets by supplying a known asset identifier. Attackers can overwrite push notification tokens and console metadata without authentication or ownership validation, redirecting notifications or denying delivery to legitimate consoles.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth() OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path. When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as: length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far beyond the frame buffer. Add a minimum length check before accessing the IV field and calling the decryption path. When processing a seq=3 response, rtw_get_ie() stores the Challenge Text IE length in ie_len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128 bytes regardless of ie_len. IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching the check already applied to OnAuthClient().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: skip sync_blockdev() on surprise removal in bdev_mark_dead() bdev_mark_dead()'s @surprise == true means the device is already gone. The filesystem callback fs_bdev_mark_dead() honours this and skips sync_filesystem(), but the bare block device path (no ->mark_dead op) lost its !surprise guard when the holder ->mark_dead callback was wired up (see Fixes), and now calls sync_blockdev() unconditionally, which can hang forever waiting on writeback that can no longer complete. syzkaller hit this via nvme_reset_work()'s "I/O queues lost" path: nvme_mark_namespaces_dead() -> blk_mark_disk_dead() -> bdev_mark_dead(bdev, true) -> sync_blockdev() blocks in folio_wait_writeback(), wedging the reset worker and every task waiting on it. Skip the sync on surprise removal, matching fs_bdev_mark_dead(); invalidate_bdev() still runs. Orderly removal (surprise == false) is unchanged. Found by FuzzNvme(Syzkaller with FEMU fuzzing framework).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Set veventq_depth upper bound iommufd_veventq_alloc() accepts any !0 veventq_depth from userspace, with an upper bound at U32_MAX. This leaves a vulnerability where userspace can allocate excessively large queues to exhaust kernel memory reserves. Cap the veventq_depth (maximum number of entries) to 1 << 19, matching the maximum number of entries in the SMMUv3 EVTQ (the largest use case today).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: chacha20poly1305 - validate poly1305 template argument chachapoly_create() still accepts the compatibility poly1305 parameter in the template name, but it assumes the second template argument is always present and immediately passes it to strcmp(). When the argument is missing, crypto_attr_alg_name() returns an error pointer. Check for that before comparing the name so malformed template instantiations fail with an error instead of dereferencing the error pointer in strcmp(). This matches the surrounding Crypto API template pattern where crypto_attr_alg_name() results are validated before string-specific use.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: guest_memfd: Treat memslot binding offset+size as unsigned values When binding a memslot to a guest_memfd file, treat the offset and size as unsigned values to fix a bug where the sum of the two can result in a false negative when checking for overflow against the size of the file. Passing unsigned values also avoids relying on somewhat obscure checks in other flows for safety, and tracks the offset and size as they are intended to be tracked, as unsigned values. On 64-bit kernels, the number of pages a memslot contains and thus the size (and offset) of its guest_memfd binding are unsigned 64-bit values. Taking the offset+size as an loff_t instead of a uoff_t inadvertently converts the unsigned value to a signed value if the offset and/or size is massive. Locally storing the offset and size as signed values is benign in and of itself (though even that is *extremely* difficult to discern), but operating on their sum is not. For the offset, KVM explicitly checks against a negative value, which might seem like a bug as KVM could incorrectly reject a legitimate binding, but that's not actually the case as KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD takes a signed value for its size, i.e. a would-be-negative offset is also greater than the maximum possible size of any guest_memfd file. Regarding the size, while KVM lacks an explicit check for a negative value, i.e. seemingly has a flawed overflow check, KVM restricts the number of pages in a single memslot to the largest positive signed 32-bit value: if (id < KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS && (mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT) > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES) return -EINVAL; and so that maximum "size" will ever be is 0x7fffffff000. The sum of the two is, however, problematic. While the size is restricted by KVM's memslot logic, the offset is not, i.e. the offset is completely unchecked until the "offset + size > i_size_read(inode)" check. If the offset is the (nearly) largest possible _positive_ value, then adding size to the offset can result in a signed, negative 64-bit value. When compared against the size of the file (guaranteed to be positive), the negative sum is always smaller, and KVM incorrectly allows the absurd offset. Opportunistically add missing includes in kvm_mm.h (instead of relying on its parents).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: caam - use print_hex_dump_devel to guard key hex dumps Use print_hex_dump_devel() for dumping sensitive key material in *_setkey() to avoid leaking secrets at runtime when CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG is enabled.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse-uring: Avoid use-after-free in fuse_uring_async_stop_queues fuse_uring_async_stop_queues() might run when the last reference on ring->queue_refs was already dropped. In order to avoid an early destruction a reference on struct fuse_conn is now taken before starting fuse_uring_async_stop_queues() and that reference is only released when that delayed work queue terminates.

Catalyst::View::Wkhtmltopdf versions before 0.6.1 for Perl allow shell command injection (RCE) via PDF render options. Options are passed directly to the wkhtmltopdf command without sanitization. Any web application that passes user-controlled options such as the page_size, orientation or margins without validation allows shell command injection. Version 0.6.0 was released with an incomplete fix for this issue. Note that the wkhtmltopdf project is no longer being developed, and users of this package should migrate to alternative solutions.