ZITADEL is an open source identity management platform. Versions prior to 3.4.9 and 4.0.0 through 4.12.2 allowed users to bypass organization enforcement during authentication. Zitadel allows applications to enforce an organzation context during authentication using scopes (urn:zitadel:iam:org:id:{id} and urn:zitadel:iam:org:domain:primary:{domainname}). If enforced, a user needs to be part of the required organization to sign in. While this was properly enforced for OAuth2/OIDC authorization requests in login V1, corresponding controls were missing for device authorization requests and all login V2 and OIDC API V2 endpoints. This allowed users to bypass the restriction and sign in with users from other organizations. Note that this enforcement allows for an additional check during authentication and applications relying on authorizations / roles assignments are not affected by this bypass. This issue has been patched in versions 3.4.9 and 4.12.3.

ZITADEL is an open source identity management platform. From version 4.0.0 to 4.11.1, a vulnerability in Zitadel's login V2 interface was discovered that allowed a possible account takeover via Default URI Redirect. This issue has been patched in version 4.12.0.

ZITADEL is an open source identity management platform. From version 4.0.0-rc.1 to 4.7.0, a potential vulnerability exists in ZITADEL's password reset mechanism in login V2. ZITADEL utilizes the Forwarded or X-Forwarded-Host header from incoming requests to construct the URL for the password reset confirmation link. This link, containing a secret code, is then emailed to the user. This issue has been patched in version 4.7.1.

ZITADEL is an open source identity management platform. From version 4.0.0 to 4.12.0, a vulnerability in Zitadel's login V2 UI allowed users to bypass login behavior and security policies and self-register new accounts or sign in using password even if corresponding options were disabled in their organizaton. This issue has been patched in version 4.12.1.

ZITADEL is an open source identity management platform. From version 4.0.0 to 4.11.1, a vulnerability in Zitadel's login V2 interface was discovered that allowed a possible account takeover via XSS in /saml-post Endpoint. This issue has been patched in version 4.12.0.

ZITADEL is an open source identity management platform. Zitadel Action V2 (introduced as early preview in 2.59.0, beta in 3.0.0 and GA in 4.0.0) is a webhook based approach to allow developers act on API request to Zitadel and customize flows such the issue of a token. Zitadel's Action target URLs can point to local hosts, potentially allowing adversaries to gather internal network information and connect to internal services. When the URL points to a local host / IP address, an adversary might gather information about the internal network structure, the services exposed on internal hosts etc. This is sometimes called a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Zitadel Actions expect responses according to specific schemas, which reduces the threat vector. The patch in version 4.11.1 resolves the issue by checking the target URL against a denylist. By default localhost, resp. loopback IPs are denied. Note that this fix was only released on v4.x. Due to the stage (preview / beta) in which the functionality was in v2.x and v3.x, the changes that have been applied to it since then and the severity, respectively the actual thread vector, a backport to the corresponding versions was not feasible. Please check the workaround section for alternative solutions if an upgrade to v4.x is not possible. If an upgrade is not possible, prevent actions from using unintended endpoints by setting network policies or firewall rules in one's own infrastructure. Note that this is outside of the functionality provided by Zitadel.

ZITADEL is an open source identity management platform. Prior to versions 4.11.1 and 3.4.7, a vulnerability in Zitadel's self-management capability allowed users to mark their email and phone as verified without going through an actual verification process. The patch in versions 4.11.1 and 3.4.7 resolves the issue by requiring the correct permission in case the verification flag is provided and only allows self-management of the email address and/or phone number itself. If an upgrade is not possible, an action (v2) could be used to prevent setting the verification flag on the own user.

ZITADEL is an open source identity management platform. Starting in version 2.31.0 and prior to versions 3.4.7 and 4.11.0, opaque OIDC access tokens in the v2 format truncated to 80 characters are still considered valid. Zitadel uses a symmetric AES encryption for opaque tokens. The cleartext payload is a concatenation of a couple of identifiers, such as a token ID and user ID. Internally Zitadel has 2 different versions of token payloads. v1 tokens are no longer created, but are still verified as to not invalidate existing session after upgrade. The cleartext payload has a format of `<token_id>:<user_id>`. v2 tokens distinguished further where the `token_id` is of the format `v2_<oidc_session_id>-at_<access_token_id>`. V1 token authZ/N session data is retrieved from the database using the (simple) `token_id` value and `user_id` value. The `user_id` (called `subject` in some parts of our code) was used as being the trusted user ID. V2 token authZ/N session data is retrieved from the database using the `oidc_session_id` and `access_token_id` and in this case the `user_id` from the token is ignored and taken from the session data in the database. By truncating the token to 80 chars, the user_id is now missing from the cleartext of the v2 token. The back-end still accepts this for above reasons. This issue is not considered exploitable, but may look awkward when reproduced. The patch in versions 4.11.0 and 3.4.7 resolves the issue by verifying the `user_id` from the token against the session data from the database. No known workarounds are available.