8.2 HIGH
- CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
- Attack Vector (AV): Network (N)
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
- Privileges Required (PR): None (N)
- User Interaction (UI): None (N)
- Scope (S): Unchanged (U)
- Confidentiality (C): None (N)
- Integrity (I): High (H)
- Availability (A): Low (L)
- Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Network (N)
- Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): Low (L)
- Modified Privileges Required (MPR): None (N)
- Modified User Interaction (MUI): None (N)
- Modified Confidentiality (MC): None (N)
- Modified Scope (MS): Unchanged (U)
- Modified Integrity (MI): High (H)
- Modified Availability (MA): Low (L)
by @LeSuisse Activity log
- Created suggestion
- @LeSuisse accepted
- @LeSuisse published on GitHub
YesWiki: Unauthenticated ActivityPub Signature-Verification Bypass via `!openssl_verify(...)` accepting `int(-1)`
YesWiki is a wiki system written in PHP. From version 4.6.2 to before version 4.6.6, HttpSignatureService::verifySignature() checks the result of PHP's openssl_verify() with a loose boolean negation - if (!openssl_verify(...)) { throw ... }. PHP's openssl_verify has four possible return values: 1, 0, -1, and "false". The -1 row is the bypass: PHP's truthiness rules make -1 a truthy value, so !(-1) === false, the throw is skipped, and the controller proceeds to processActivity(). Any condition that makes OpenSSL's EVP_VerifyFinal() return -1 triggers the bypass. The reachable consequence is the controller silently treats a failed verification as success and processes the attacker's payload. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.6.
References
-
https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/security/advisories/GHSA-mv28-wj57-f57g x_refsource_CONFIRM
-
https://github.com/YesWiki/yeswiki/releases/tag/v4.6.6 x_refsource_MISC
Affected products
- ==>= 4.6.2, < 4.6.6