An Out-of-Bounds Write vulnerability is present in Ashlar-Vellum Cobalt, Xenon, Argon, Lithium, and Cobalt Share versions 12.6.1204.216 and prior that could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code when a specially crafted VC6 file is being parsed.

An Out-of-Bounds Read vulnerability is present in Ashlar-Vellum Cobalt, Xenon, Argon, Lithium, and Cobalt Share versions 12.6.1204.216 and prior that could allow an attacker to disclose information or execute arbitrary code when a specially crafted VC6 file is being parsed.

An Out-of-Bounds Read vulnerability is present in Ashlar-Vellum Cobalt, Xenon, Argon, Lithium, and Cobalt Share versions 12.6.1204.216 and prior that could allow an attacker to disclose information or execute arbitrary code when a specially crafted VC6 file is being parsed.

The Intel EPT paging code uses an optimization to defer flushing of any cached EPT state until the p2m lock is dropped, so that multiple modifications done under the same locked region only issue a single flush. Freeing of paging structures however is not deferred until the flushing is done, and can result in freed pages transiently being present in cached state. Such stale entries can point to memory ranges not owned by the guest, thus allowing access to unintended memory regions.

Any guest issuing a Xenstore command accessing a node using the (illegal) node path "/local/domain/", will crash xenstored due to a clobbered error indicator in xenstored when verifying the node path. Note that the crash is forced via a failing assert() statement in xenstored. In case xenstored is being built with NDEBUG #defined, an unprivileged guest trying to access the node path "/local/domain/" will result in it no longer being serviced by xenstored, other guests (including dom0) will still be serviced, but xenstored will use up all cpu time it can get.

Shadow mode tracing code uses a set of per-CPU variables to avoid cumbersome parameter passing. Some of these variables are written to with guest controlled data, of guest controllable size. That size can be larger than the variable, and bounding of the writes was missing.

In the context switch logic Xen attempts to skip an IBPB in the case of a vCPU returning to a CPU on which it was the previous vCPU to run. While safe for Xen's isolation between vCPUs, this prevents the guest kernel correctly isolating between tasks. Consider: 1) vCPU runs on CPU A, running task 1. 2) vCPU moves to CPU B, idle gets scheduled on A. Xen skips IBPB. 3) On CPU B, guest kernel switches from task 1 to 2, issuing IBPB. 4) vCPU moves back to CPU A. Xen skips IBPB again. Now, task 2 is running on CPU A with task 1's training still in the BTB.