Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. From 0.21.0 until 2.4.0, the project duplication operation in pkg/models/project_duplicate.go allows an authenticated user who can read a source project to place its duplicate beneath an arbitrary target parent project. ProjectDuplicate.CanCreate calls parent.CanCreate on an unhydrated Project containing only the body supplied parent_project_id instead of calling parent.CanWrite, so the target parent write-permission check is skipped. The ordinary project creation path enforces that permission, but PUT /api/v1/projects/{project}/duplicate does not, allowing attacker-owned content to be injected into another user or team project hierarchy. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.

Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. From 0.24.6 until 2.4.0, DELETE /api/v1/projects/:project/views/:view permits an authenticated user to supply a view identifier from another project while authorizing only against an attacker-controlled project identifier. ProjectView.CanDelete in pkg/models/project_view_permissions.go does not establish that the view belongs to the path project, and ProjectView.Delete in pkg/models/project_view.go continues after the scoped project_views delete affects no rows. Its subsequent deletes select task_buckets and task_positions only by project_view_id, allowing cross-tenant destruction of Kanban assignments and ordering while leaving the victim view and tasks intact. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.

Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket}/tasks accepts a body supplied task_id but TaskBucket.CanUpdate in pkg/models/kanban_task_bucket.go authorizes only the project, view, and bucket from the URL. updateTaskBucket then calls Task.ReadOne without a separate task permission check, returns the victim task contents, and can update the task done state when the attacker chooses a done bucket. Because task identifiers are global sequential values, an authenticated user can enumerate cross-tenant tasks and modify their completion metadata through both the v1 and v2 routes that share this model. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.

Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/kanban.go. The permission check validates that the bucket currently belongs to the URL project and view but does not validate the body selected destination view, allowing any authenticated user to relocate an attacker-owned bucket into another tenant’s Kanban view. The injected bucket retains attacker-controlled content and ownership, enabling cross-tenant defacement. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.

Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. From 2.3.0 until 2.4.0, a user with Write but not Admin permission on a shared child project can detach it from its parent hierarchy by submitting parent_project_id equal to 0 to POST /api/v1/projects/{project}. The Project.CanUpdate authorization check in pkg/models/project_permissions.go and UpdateProject logic in pkg/models/project.go only gate nonzero parent values, while UpdateProject always persists parent_project_id, so the explicit zero value bypasses the Admin requirement introduced for CVE-2026-35595. Detachment severs the recursive permission-inheritance chain and can disrupt the owner’s hierarchy and inherited collaborator access. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0.

Vikunja through 2.4.0 contains a principal-type confusion vulnerability where LinkSharing principals with id N are treated as user principals with users.id == N at three permission checks lacking type guards. Attackers with a link-share JWT can remove victims from teams, enumerate and delete victim bot users, or read team rosters by exploiting id collisions in the autoincrement space.

Vikunja versions >= 0.24.0 and <= 2.3.0 contain a broken object level authorization (BOLA) vulnerability in the task-collection endpoint (GET /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/tasks). The endpoint loads the requested project view from the URL path without verifying the caller is authorized for it. For a link-share token holder, the task scope is pinned to the share's own project, but the view is taken from the attacker-controlled path and never re-validated. As a result, a holder of any project share link can read any other tenant's kanban bucket records — bucket titles and the full created_by user object (username, name, id) — for every view in the instance. The same missing pre-authorization view load also creates a project/view-ID existence oracle (404 vs. non-404) usable by link shares and ordinary authenticated users. Task contents remain constrained to the share's own project and are not disclosed. Fixed in 2.4.0.

Vikunja versions 0.22.0 through 2.3.0 fail to validate the principal type in API token management. Because user IDs and link-share IDs are independent numeric sequences and both resolve through a generic web.Auth.GetID() interface, a link-share JWT whose numeric ID equals a target user's ID is treated as that user by the /api/v1/tokens endpoints. An authenticated attacker can obtain a target's numeric user ID via authenticated user search, then create link shares on an attacker-writable project until the link-share sequence reaches that value, and use the resulting link-share JWT to list, create, and delete the target user's API tokens (including issuing a new token with attacker-chosen scopes under the target's permissions). Fixed in version 2.4.0.

Vikunja before 2.2.1 contains an authorization flaw where the LinkSharing.ReadAll endpoint exposes share hashes to users with read access, enabling permission escalation to admin-level shares. The GetTaskAttachment endpoint performs permission checks against user-supplied task IDs but fetches attachments by sequential ID without verifying ownership, allowing attackers to download and delete all file attachments across all projects instance-wide.

Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.3.0, the CalDAV GetResource and GetResourcesByList methods fetch tasks by UID from the database without verifying that the authenticated user has access to the task's project. Any authenticated CalDAV user who knows (or guesses) a task UID can read the full task data from any project on the instance. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.3.0.