Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in DepartmentPresenter::formattedNameLink() where department names are rendered unescaped in the fallback branch for users without departments.view permission. Users with departments.edit permission can inject malicious scripts into department names that execute in the browsers of all department members when they load their My Assets page.

Snipe-IT before 8.7.0 fails to properly gate access to encrypted custom-field values in asset form templates for listbox, textarea, markdown-textarea, and date/datetime picker elements. Authenticated users with assets.edit, assets.checkin, assets.checkout, or assets.audit permissions can read plaintext encrypted custom field values by opening asset forms, bypassing the assets.view.encrypted_custom_fields permission check.

Snipe-IT versions up to and including 8.6.3 contain a race condition (TOCTOU) in the consumable checkout API endpoint (POST /api/v1/consumables/{consumable_id}/checkout). The requested quantity is validated against the number of remaining units before the database transaction begins, and the transaction then creates the checkout records without locking the consumable row or re-checking availability. An authenticated user with permission to check out consumables can submit concurrent checkout requests for the same consumable so that both requests pass the availability check and succeed, over-allocating stock and driving the remaining inventory negative (e.g., a consumable with 1 remaining unit ends at -1 after two concurrent 1-unit checkouts). The issue is fixed in 8.7.0, which re-fetches the parent row under lockForUpdate inside the transaction and re-validates availability.

snipe-it versions before 8.7.0 fail to enforce per-instance FMCS scoping in asset audit endpoints, relying solely on query-layer filtering instead of policy-layer authorization checks. Attackers with valid sessions and assets.audit permissions could write audit log entries against cross-company assets if the query-layer scope were bypassed or refactored.

Snipe-IT versions <= 8.6.3 (fixed in 8.7.0) do not check the return value of storage write operations in ImageUploadRequest::handleImages(). Because Laravel's default disk mode does not throw on failure, a silently failed Storage::disk('public')->put(...) call still caused the application to delete the previous image via deleteExistingImage() and to reassign and persist the model's image reference to the new filename, destroying the existing image and leaving the database row pointing at a file that was never written. A mirror problem existed in deleteExistingImage(), where a failed Storage::delete() still nulled the model's image field, orphaning the file on disk. The condition is not directly attacker-controlled: it is triggered when any legitimate authenticated user submits an image upload while the storage backend transiently fails (for example an S3 network error, a local filesystem permission problem, or quota exhaustion). The result is unrecoverable loss of the prior image and a durable inconsistency between the database and disk that requires manual reconciliation. All models whose controllers route through ImageUploadRequest::handleImages (assets, asset models, users, companies, manufacturers, locations, categories, suppliers, departments, and other image-carrying models) are affected.

Snipe-IT is an IT asset management application. In Snipe-IT master-branch builds after 8.6.3 (the code was never included in a tagged release), SettingsController::downloadLocationScopingReport streams the FMCS location-scoping mismatch report (GET /admin/settings/location-scoping-report.csv) through a bare fputcsv() call without applying League\Csv\EscapeFormula, unlike the other CSV exports which honor config('app.escape_formulas'). An authenticated user with ordinary create/edit rights can place a spreadsheet formula in free-text fields that appear in the report (item name, asset tag, serial, item or location company name, location name) and arrange for the record to be FMCS-mismatched so it is included in the export. When a superuser downloads the report and opens it in Excel, LibreOffice Calc, or Google Sheets with formula evaluation enabled and external-content warnings dismissed or disabled, cells beginning with =, +, -, @, tab, or CR are executed in the victim's spreadsheet context, enabling data exfiltration (e.g., HYPERLINK/WEBSERVICE) or, on Windows Excel, legacy DDE command execution. This issue is fixed in version 8.7.0.

Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 contain an improper ownership management vulnerability in the consumables checkout API endpoint that records the checkout target user's id in the created_by column instead of the authenticated caller's id. Authenticated attackers with consumables.checkout permission can perform checkouts that result in misattributed audit trail entries in the consumables_users pivot table, obscuring which operator performed the action.

Snipe-IT versions 8.2.0 through 8.6.x (fixed in 8.7.0) contain an incorrect authorization flaw in app/Http/Controllers/Users/UsersController::update(). The single-user edit route assigned the activated field from the request payload before evaluating the canEditAuthFields authorization gate, so an authenticated non-admin user holding the users.edit permission in the target's company scope can submit a full valid PUT request to /users/{id} and toggle the activated flag on any user, including admin and superuser accounts. Deactivating an admin locks that account out of the application until another admin or superuser re-enables it. Only the activated field is affected; username, email, password and permissions remain protected by the gate, no data is disclosed, and the API (Api\UsersController::update) and bulk-edit paths are not affected.

Snipe-IT versions >= 7.0.12 and <= 8.6.3 contain an authorization bypass in the Livewire importer component (App\Livewire\Importer, mounted at the imports.index route). The component only checked the broad 'import' ability at mount time, while its files() and activeFile() computed properties queried the imports table with no owner or company scope. As a result, any authenticated non-superuser holding the import permission could view every Import record on the instance (original filename, file_path, filesize, import_type and creation timestamp) and could invoke the selectFile($id) Livewire action with any auto-incrementing Import ID to load another user's record, exposing its stored preview data (header_row column headers and first_row, the first data row of the CSV). Because import CSVs commonly contain personal data, asset serial numbers and license keys, this discloses sensitive information; in Full Multiple Companies Support (FMCS) deployments the disclosure also crosses company/tenant boundaries. Impact is limited to preview data rather than the full CSV file, and superusers were unaffected. Fixed in version 8.7.0, which scopes non-superuser reads to imports owned by the caller.

snipe-it versions before 8.7.0 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in location print endpoints that fails to enforce per-model authorization checks. Authenticated attackers with location view permission can access printassigned and printallassigned endpoints to retrieve related users, assets, accessories, consumables, and components regardless of their individual model permissions.