SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the /api/lute/html2BlockDOM on the desktop copies local files pointed to by file:// links in pasted HTML into the workspace assets directory without validating paths against a sensitive-path list. Together with GET /assets/*path, which only requires authentication, a publish-service visitor can cause the desktop kernel to copy any readable sensitive file and then read it via GET, leading to exfiltration of sensitive files. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.

SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Versions 3.6.0 and below contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock endpoint. When the method parameter is set to 2, the endpoint passes user-supplied input directly as a raw SQL statement to the underlying SQLite database without any authorization or read-only checks. This allows any authenticated user — including those with the Reader role — to execute arbitrary SQL statements (SELECT, DELETE, UPDATE, DROP TABLE, etc.) against the application's database. This is inconsistent with the application's own security model: the dedicated SQL endpoint (/api/query/sql) correctly requires both CheckAdminRole and CheckReadonly middleware, but the search endpoint bypasses these controls entirely. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.

SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the backend renderREADME function uses lute.New() without calling SetSanitize(true), allowing raw HTML embedded in Markdown to pass through unmodified. The frontend then assigns the rendered HTML to innerHTML without any additional sanitization. A malicious package author can embed arbitrary JavaScript in their README that executes when a user clicks to view the package details. Because SiYuan's Electron configuration enables nodeIntegration: true with contextIsolation: false, this XSS escalates directly to full Remote Code Execution. The issue was patched in version 3.6.1.

SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to version 3.6.2, the `IsSensitivePath()` function in `kernel/util/path.go` uses a denylist approach that was recently expanded (GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6, commit 9914fd1) but remains incomplete. Multiple security-relevant Linux directories are not blocked, including `/opt` (application data), `/usr` (local configs/binaries), `/home` (other users), `/mnt` and `/media` (mounted volumes). The `globalCopyFiles` and `importStdMd` endpoints rely on `IsSensitivePath` as their primary defense against reading files outside the workspace. Version 3.6.2 contains an updated fix.

SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to version 3.6.2, the Siyuan kernel exposes an unauthenticated file-serving endpoint under `/appearance/*filepath.` Due to improper path sanitization, attackers can perform directory traversal and read arbitrary files accessible to the server process. Authentication checks explicitly exclude this endpoint, allowing exploitation without valid credentials. Version 3.6.2 fixes this issue.

SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the globalCopyFiles API eads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API. An admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.

SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, POST /api/import/importSY and POST /api/import/importZipMd write uploaded archives to a path derived from the multipart filename field without sanitization, allowing an admin to write files to arbitrary locations outside the temp directory - including system paths that enable RCE. This can lead to aata destruction by overwriting workspace or application files, and for Docker containers running as root (common default), this grants full container compromise. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.

SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the mobile file tree (MobileFiles.ts) renders notebook names via innerHTML without HTML escaping when processing renamenotebook WebSocket events. The desktop version (Files.ts) properly uses escapeHtml() for the same operation. An authenticated user who can rename notebooks can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes on any mobile client viewing the file tree. Since Electron is configured with nodeIntegration: true and contextIsolation: false, the injected JavaScript has full Node.js access, escalating stored XSS to full remote code execution. The mobile layout is also used in the Electron desktop app when the window is narrow, making this exploitable on desktop as well. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.

SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the WebSocket endpoint (/ws) allows unauthenticated connections when specific URL parameters are provided (?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth). This bypass, intended for the login page to keep the kernel alive, allows any external client — including malicious websites via cross-origin WebSocket — to connect and receive all server push events in real-time. These events leak sensitive document metadata including document titles, notebook names, file paths, and all CRUD operations performed by authenticated users. Combined with the absence of Origin header validation, a malicious website can silently connect to a victim's local SiYuan instance and monitor their note-taking activity. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.

SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Versions 3.6.0 and below render package metadata fields (displayName, description) using template literals without HTML escaping. A malicious package author can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript into these fields, which executes automatically when any user browses the Bazaar page. Because SiYuan's Electron configuration enables nodeIntegration: true with contextIsolation: false, this XSS escalates directly to full Remote Code Execution on the victim's operating system — with zero user interaction beyond opening the marketplace tab. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.