A vulnerability has been identified in [Rancher's Extensions](https://ranchermanager.docs.rancher.com/integrations-in-rancher/rancher-extensions) where malicious code can be injected in Rancher through a path traversal in the `compressedEndpoint` field inside a `UIPlugin` deployment. A malicious UI extension could abuse that to: * Overwrite Rancher binaries or configuration to inject code. * Write to /var/lib/rancher/ to tamper with cluster state. * If hostPath volumes are mounted, write to the host node filesystem. * Use this issue to chain with other attack vectors.

Fleet's Helm deployer did not fully apply ServiceAccount impersonation in two code paths, allowing a tenant with git push access to a Fleet-monitored repository to read secrets from any namespace on every downstream cluster targeted by their `GitRepo`.

A vulnerability has been identified within Rancher Manager, where using self-signed CA certificates and passing the -skip-verify flag to the Rancher CLI login command without also passing the –cacert flag results in the CLI attempting to fetch CA certificates stored in Rancher’s setting cacerts.

A malicious user can manipulate the parameters.pathPattern to create PersistentVolumes in arbitrary locations on the host node, potentially overwriting sensitive files or gaining access to unintended directories.