Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, the /forms/chromium/convert/url and /forms/chromium/screenshot/url routes accept url=file:///tmp/... from anonymous callers. The default Chromium deny-list intentionally exempts file:///tmp/ so HTML/Markdown routes can load their own request-local assets, and those routes apply a per-request AllowedFilePrefixes guard to scope the read. The URL routes never set AllowedFilePrefixes, so the scope guard silently skips. Alice enumerates /tmp/, walks Gotenberg's per-request working directories, and reads the raw source files of other in-flight conversions as rendered PDF output. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.

Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.31.0, the default deny-lists used by Gotenberg's downloadFrom feature and webhook feature are bypassable. Because the filter is regex-based and case-sensitive, an unauthenticated attacker can supply URLs such as http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:... and reach loopback or private HTTP services that the default deny-list is intended to block. This crosses a real security boundary because an external caller can force the server to make outbound requests to internal-only targets. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.31.0.

Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, pdfengines/merge, pdfengines/split, libreoffice/convert, chromium/convert/url, chromium/convert/html, and chromium/convert/markdown accept stampSource=pdf + stampExpression=/path and watermarkSource=pdf + watermarkExpression=/path from anonymous callers. The dedicated stamp/watermark routes require an uploaded file when the source type is image or pdf; these six routes only overwrite the expression when a file is uploaded, leaving the user-controlled path intact when no file is attached. pdfcpu opens the path and composites its pages onto the output PDF, which returns to the caller. An attacker reads any PDF the Gotenberg process can access on the container filesystem. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.

Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.31.0, Gotenberg only checks if the tag is exactly FileName, so System:FileName slips right through and ExifTool happily renames the file. This allows remote attackers to move, rename, and change permissions for arbitrary files. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.31.0.

Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.31.0, Gotenberg's /forms/pdfengines/metadata/write HTTP endpoint accepts a JSON metadata object and passes its keys directly to ExifTool via the go-exiftool library. No validation is performed on key characters. A \n embedded in a JSON key splits the ExifTool stdin stream into a new argument line, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary ExifTool flags — including -if, which evaluates Perl expressions. This achieves unauthenticated OS command execution in a single HTTP request. The response is HTTP 200 with a valid PDF, making the attack transparent to basic monitoring. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.31.0.

Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, Gotenberg's Chromium URL-to-PDF endpoint (/forms/chromium/convert/url) has no default protection against HTTP/HTTPS-based SSRF. The default deny-list regex only blocks file:// URIs. An unauthenticated attacker can point Chromium at any internal IP — including loopback, RFC 1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints — and receive the response rendered as a PDF. Additionally, even when operators configure a custom deny-list, the protection is bypassed via HTTP redirects. Gotenberg's Chromium instance follows 302 redirects from an attacker-controlled external URL to internal targets without re-validating the redirect destination against the deny-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.

Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, the LibreOffice conversion endpoint (/forms/libreoffice/convert) passes uploaded documents directly to LibreOffice without inspecting their content. LibreOffice then fetches any embedded external URLs on its own, completely bypassing the SSRF filters. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.

Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.30.0, The ExifTool metadata write blocklist in Gotenberg can be bypassed using ExifTool's group-prefix syntax, enabling arbitrary file rename, move, hardlink, and symlink creation on the server. ExifTool supports group-prefix syntax where File:FileName is processed identically to FileName -- the prefix is stripped by SetNewValue in Writer.pl before tag matching. The safeKeyPattern regex (^[a-zA-Z0-9\-_.:]+$) allows colons, so prefixed tag names pass validation. Any prefix works: File:FileName, System:Directory, a:HardLink, etc. Additionally, FilePermissions, FileUserID, and FileGroupID pseudo-tags are not blocked at all and can modify file attributes without any prefix. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.30.0.

Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. Prior to 8.32.0, the webhook middleware spawns a goroutine that holds a reference to the request's echo.Context after the synchronous handler returns ErrAsyncProcess and Echo recycles the context back to its sync.Pool. When a concurrent request claims the recycled context, c.Reset() clears the store. If the webhook goroutine reaches hardTimeoutMiddleware at that moment, an unchecked type assertion on a nil store entry panics outside any recover() scope, crashing the Gotenberg process. Any anonymous caller reaches the webhook path (default webhook-deny-list filters only the webhook destination, not the submitter). A single-source stress of ~24 webhook requests plus ~60 GET /version requests crashes the process in about two seconds. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.32.0.

Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. In versions 8.30.1 and earlier, the metadata write endpoint validates metadata keys for control characters but leaves metadata values unsanitized. A newline character in a metadata value splits the ExifTool stdin line into two separate arguments, allowing injection of arbitrary ExifTool pseudo-tags such as -FileName, -Directory, -SymLink, and -HardLink. This is a bypass of the incomplete key-sanitization fix introduced in v8.30.1. An unauthenticated attacker can rename or move any PDF being processed to an arbitrary path in the container filesystem, overwrite arbitrary files, or create symlinks and hard links at arbitrary paths.