Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, GET /api/v1/retrieval/ returns live RAG pipeline configuration to any unauthenticated HTTP client. No Authorization header, cookie, or API key is required. Every adjacent endpoint on the same router (/embedding, /config) is correctly guarded by get_admin_user making this a targeted omission. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.3, the audio transcription upload endpoint takes the file extension from the user-supplied filename and saves the file under CACHE_DIR/audio/transcriptions/.. The /cache/{path} route serves these files via FileResponse, which sets Content-Type from the on-disk extension and emits no Content-Disposition. A verified user with the default-on chat.stt permission can upload a polyglot WAV+HTML file named pwn.html and trick any other user into opening the resulting URL — the response comes back as text/html and any embedded <script> runs in the Open WebUI origin. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.3.

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.3, the POST /api/v1/notes/{id}/pin endpoint performs a write operation (toggling the is_pinned field) but only checks for read permission. Users with read-only access to a shared note can pin/unpin it, which is a state-modifying action that should require write permission. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.3.

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, Pin/Unpin is a write operation (modifies the message's is_pinned , pinned_by, pinned_at fields), but in standard channels it only checks read permission, allowing users with read-only access to pin/unpin any message. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, the ydoc:document:update Socket.IO event handler checks whether the sender is a member of the document's Socket.IO room (line 678) but does not verify that the sender has write permission. Users with read-only access join the document room via ydoc:document:join, which only requires read permission (line 520). Once in the room, the user can emit ydoc:document:update events that modify the in-memory Yjs document state and are broadcast to all other collaborators in real time. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, a user just needs to use the API endpoint: /api/chat/completions with their own API key (generated in OWUI) and the Chat ID of another user to continue the conversation of the other user. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in _process_picture_url() in backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py (line ~1338). The function fetches arbitrary URLs from OAuth picture claims without applying validate_url(), allowing an attacker to force the server to make HTTP requests to internal resources and exfiltrate the full response. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, the POST /api/v1/evaluations/feedback endpoint in Open WebUI v0.9.2 is vulnerable to mass assignment via FeedbackForm, which uses model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow'). Due to an insecure dictionary merge order in insert_new_feedback(), an authenticated attacker can inject a user_id field in the request body that overwrites the server-derived value, creating feedback records attributed to any arbitrary user. This corrupts the model evaluation leaderboard (Elo ratings) and enables identity spoofing. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, he LDAP and OAuth authentication flows use a TOCTOU (Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use) pattern for first-user admin role assignment. The regular signup handler (signup_handler in auths.py, line 663) was explicitly patched to prevent this race with the comment "Insert with default role first to avoid TOCTOU race", but the LDAP and OAuth code paths were never updated with the same fix. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, the validate_url() function in backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py only validates the initial URL submitted by the caller. The HTTP clients used downstream (sync requests, async aiohttp, langchain's WebBaseLoader) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and do not re-validate the redirect target against the private-IP / metadata-IP block list. Any authenticated user can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address (e.g. 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, RFC1918) and read the internal response body via the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint, the /api/v1/images/... endpoints, the /api/chat/completions endpoint with an image_url content part, and any other route that calls these helpers. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.