libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. Prior to version 1.22.0, two bugs in libheif chain to leak process heap memory as visible pixel values in decoded grid images. An attacker who uploads a crafted AVIF/HEIC file to any server-side image processor (WordPress, Sharp/libvips, ImageMagick, etc.) can recover heap data - including library function pointers sufficient to defeat ASLR, or any other secret - from the publicly-downloadable transcoded JPEG/PNG/WebP output. Local attack vectors are also possible. Version 1.22.0 fixes the issue.

libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. The fix for CVE-2026-3949 (commit `b97c8b5`, PR #1712) introduced an integer overflow in the very security check it added. The check itself can be bypassed, allowing a crafted HEIF file with a VVC track to trigger the same out-of-bounds heap read that CVE-2026-3949 was meant to prevent. This is a separate, currently-unpatched vulnerability. Issue #1712 was closed as fixed without testing the edge case where `size` is near `UINT32_MAX`. Version 1.22.0 patches the issue.

libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. Prior to version 1.22.1, the uncompressed HEIF decoder validates explicit icef compressed-unit offsets using unit_offset + unit_size. Because the addition can wrap, a crafted HEIF file can pass the range check and then construct a vector from iterators outside the compressed item buffer, producing an out-of-bounds heap read and crash. Version 1.22.1 patches the issue.

libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. In versions 1.21.2 and prior, a malformed HEIF sequence file can trigger an out-of-bounds read in core sequence parsing logic, causing DoS. A malformed file can have stco.entry_count == 0 (creating no chunks) while still passing validation because saio.entry_count == 0 matches, but with saiz.sample_count > 0 the SampleAuxInfoReader constructor still enters its loop. This leads to an out-of-bounds dereference on the empty chunks[0] in chunked mode.

libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. In versions 1.21.2 and prior, a crafted HEIF sequence file where the saiz box declares more samples than actually exist in the track's chunk table causes a heap-buffer-overflow (out-of-bounds read) in the SampleAuxInfoReader constructor. The SampleAuxInfoReader constructor iterates over saiz->get_num_samples() samples but doesn't validate that this count is consistent with the number of chunks in the chunks vector. When saiz declares more samples than the chunks cover, the loop increments current_chunk past chunks.size(), causing an out-of-bounds read on the chunks vector. The vulnerability is triggered during file parsing (heif_context_read_from_file) without any additional user interaction. Any application using libheif to open untrusted HEIF files is affected. This issue has been fixed in version 1.22.0.

A vulnerability was identified in strukturag libheif up to 1.21.2. This impacts the function Track::load of the file libheif/sequences/track.cc of the component stsz/stts. The manipulation leads to out-of-bounds read. The attack needs to be performed locally. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. Applying a patch is the recommended action to fix this issue. The patch available is inofficial and not approved yet.

libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. In versions 1.21.2 and below, a crafted 800-byte HEIF sequence file causes an infinite loop in Box_stts::get_sample_duration(), consuming 100% CPU indefinitely with zero progress, leading to DoS. The loop has no iteration limit or timeout and is triggered during file open (parsing) - before any user interaction or image decoding. The process stays alive (no crash, no error logged), making it invisible to crash-based monitoring. This issue has been fixed in version 1.22.0.

libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. Versions 1.21.2 and prior contain a heap-buffer-overflow (write) vulnerability in the grid tile compositing, allowing an attacker to write 64 bytes of fully attacker-controlled data past the end of a chroma plane heap allocation by crafting a HEIF/AVIF file with a 1×4 grid of odd-height tiles. The overflow is triggered during normal image decoding with default build configuration. The written bytes are chroma (Cb/Cr) pixel values from the attacking tile, giving the attacker full control over the overflow content. This issue has been fixed in version 1.22.0.

libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. In versions 1.21.2 and prior, when decoding a HEIF grid image with strict_decoding=false (the default), a corrupted tile silently fails to decode and the library returns heif_error_Ok with no indication of failure, leading to an uninitialized heap memory information leak. The canvas is allocated via create_clone_image_at_new_size() → plane.alloc() → new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[allocation_size] which does not zero the memory; only the alpha plane is explicitly initialized via fill_plane(), so the Y, Cb, and Cr planes contain whatever was previously at that heap address. The failed tile's region of the canvas is never written. It retains uninitialized heap data that is delivered to the caller as decoded pixel values (4,096 bytes per Y/Cb/Cr plane = 12,288+ bytes total). Any application using libheif to decode grid-based HEIF/AVIF files with default settings is vulnerable: a crafted .heic or .avif file causes 4,096+ bytes of heap memory to appear as pixel values in the decoded image, and the calling application receives heif_error_Ok, so it has no indication the output contains heap garbage. In server-side image processing, an uploaded crafted HEIF decoded and re-encoded (e.g., as PNG/JPEG for thumbnails, CDN, social media) can leak cross-user data such as auth tokens, database results, and other users' image data. This issue has been fixed in version 1.22.0.

libheif is a HEIF and AVIF file format decoder and encoder. Versions 1.21.2 and below contain a heap buffer overflow in MaskImageCodec::decode_mask_image(). When decoding a HEIF file containing a mask image (mski), the function copies the full iloc extent data into a pixel buffer using memcpy(dst, data.data(), data.size()). The copy length data.size() is determined by the iloc extent in the file (attacker-controlled), while the destination buffer is sized based on the declared image dimensions. Because no upper-bound check exists on the data length, a crafted file whose iloc extent exceeds the pixel buffer allocation overflows the heap. The vulnerable single-memcpy branch is reached when the mskC property specifies bits_per_pixel = 8 and the ispe property declares an even width ≥ 64 (so that stride == width), with no changes to default security limits or external codec plugins required. This issue has been fixed in version 1.22.0.