hoppscotch is an open source API development ecosystem. Prior to version 2026.2.1, the DELETE /v1/access-tokens/revoke endpoint allows any authenticated user to delete any other user's PAT by providing its ID, with no ownership verification. This issue has been patched in version 2026.2.1.

hoppscotch is an open source API development ecosystem. Prior to version 2026.2.0, an unauthenticated attacker can overwrite the entire infrastructure configuration of a self-hosted Hoppscotch instance including OAuth provider credentials and SMTP settings by sending a single HTTP POST request with no authentication. The endpoint POST /v1/onboarding/config has no authentication guard and performs no check on whether onboarding was already completed. A successful exploit allows the attacker to replace the instance's Google/GitHub/Microsoft OAuth application credentials with their own, causing all subsequent user logins via SSO to authenticate against the attacker's OAuth app. The attacker captures OAuth tokens and email addresses of every user who logs in after the exploit. Additionally, the endpoint returns a recovery token that can be used to read all stored secrets in plaintext, including SMTP passwords and any other configured credentials. Version 2026.2.0 fixes the issue.

hoppscotch is an open source API development ecosystem. Prior to version 2026.2.0, the `userCollection` GraphQL query accepts an arbitrary collection ID and returns the full collection data — including title, type, and the serialized `data` field containing HTTP requests with headers and potentially secrets — to any authenticated user, without verifying that the requesting user owns the collection. This is an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) caused by a missing authorization check that exists on every other operation in the same resolver. Version 2026.2.0 fixes the issue.

hoppscotch is an open source API development ecosystem. Prior to version 2026.2.0, any logged-in user can read, modify or delete another user's personal environment by ID. `user-environments.resolver.ts:82-109`, `updateUserEnvironment` mutation uses `@UseGuards(GqlAuthGuard)` but is missing the `@GqlUser()` decorator entirely. The user's identity is never extracted, so the service receives only the environment ID and performs a `prisma.userEnvironment.update({ where: { id } })` without any ownership filter. `deleteUserEnvironment` does extract the user but the service only uses the UID to check if the target is a global environment. Actual delete query uses WHERE { id } without AND userUid. hoppscotch environments store API keys, auth tokens and secrets used in API requests. An authenticated attacker who obtains another user's environment ID can read their secrets, replace them with malicious values or delete them entirely. The environment ID format is CUID, which limits mass exploitation but insider threat and combined info leak scenarios are realistic. Version 2026.2.0 fixes the issue.