The nscd service in the GNU C Library 2.3.4 onwards may crash due to a stack overflow when a malicious DNS server returns too large a response for a DNS query, resulting in degraded DNS resolution for the system. Exploitation of this bug needs a system that has nscd enabled and using an untrusted DNS server for name resolution, with the compromised DNS server being capable of processing records large enough to result in a stack overflow in an nscd thread stack.  During experimentation, bind 9 was unable to handle large records, but that could change in future or with a different name server.  In typical installations, nscd is executed in an isolated context as its own user without a shell, due to which any compromise of that service is isolated. There is a remote possibility of nscd cache corruption if an attacker manages to get the stack pointer into a desired point in the heap, potentially resulting in other caches in nscd being overwritten with corrupt data through the stack overflow, until the buggy code path eventually results in a crash. Finally, a crash in nscd may result in performance degradation when resolving names, but it does not result in a denial of service.

Passing an effectively empty string to the `,ccs=` syntax extension of the mode argument in the `fopen` function in the GNU C Library version 2.45 or earlier may result in a heap buffer overflow when the mode string input to the function is attacker controlled. This usage pattern is not seen in applications in common GNU/Linux distributions and applications that process user-supplied values for `ccs` should not pass them through without validation.

Calling gethostbyaddr or gethostbyaddr_r with a configured nsswitch.conf that specifies the library's DNS backend in the GNU C Library version 2.34 to version 2.43 could, with a crafted response from the configured DNS server, result in a violation of the DNS specification that causes the application to treat a non-answer section of the DNS response as a valid answer.

Calling NSS-backed functions that support caching via nscd may call the nscd client side code and in the GNU C Library version 2.36 under high load on x86_64 systems, the client may call memcmp on inputs that are concurrently modified by other processes or threads and crash. The nscd client in the GNU C Library uses the memcmp function with inputs that may be concurrently modified by another thread, potentially resulting in spurious cache misses, which in itself is not a security issue.  However in the GNU C Library version 2.36 an optimized implementation of memcmp was introduced for x86_64 which could crash when invoked with such undefined behaviour, turning this into a potential crash of the nscd client and the application that uses it. This implementation was backported to the 2.35 branch, making the nscd client in that branch vulnerable as well.  Subsequently, the fix for this issue was backported to all vulnerable branches in the GNU C Library repository. It is advised that distributions that may have cherry-picked the memcpy SSE2 optimization in their copy of the GNU C Library, also apply the fix to avoid the potential crash in the nscd client.

An insufficient entropy vulnerability was found in glibc. The getrandom and arc4random family of functions may return predictable randomness if these functions are called again after the fork, which happens concurrently with a call to any of these functions.

Passing too large an alignment to the memalign suite of functions (memalign, posix_memalign, aligned_alloc, valloc, pvalloc) in the GNU C Library version 2.30 to 2.42 may result in an integer overflow, which could consequently result in a heap corruption.