Path traversal vulnerability in Gleam's handling of custom documentation pages allows arbitrary file read and file write outside the intended documentation output directory. The documentation.pages entries from gleam.toml are incorporated into filesystem paths without sufficient validation or confinement to the intended project and documentation output directories. The documentation.pages[].path field can be used to write generated documentation files outside the intended build/dev/docs/<package>/ output directory. The documentation.pages[].source field can be used to read files outside the project directory and embed their contents into generated documentation output. An attacker who can convince a victim to run gleam docs build on an untrusted project, or with untrusted gleam.toml content, can cause local files readable by the victim to be included in generated documentation artifacts, and can cause generated documentation files to be written outside the intended docs output directory. This issue affects Gleam from 1.16.0 until 1.17.0.

Symlink following vulnerability in Gleam's Hex package export allows files outside the project root to be embedded in the generated package tarball. The file collection helpers (gleam_files, native_files, private_files) in compiler-cli/src/fs.rs use follow_links(true) when walking publishable directories such as src/ and priv/. The collected paths are added to the package archive via add_path_to_tar in compiler-cli/src/publish.rs without verifying that the resolved target remains within the project root. A symlink placed under a publishable directory will cause gleam export hex-tarball or gleam publish to embed the contents of the symlink target into the generated Hex package. An attacker with write access to the project repository can place a symlink in src/ or priv/ pointing to an arbitrary file. When a maintainer or CI pipeline runs gleam publish or gleam export hex-tarball, local files readable by the publisher (such as secrets, tokens, or SSH keys) are silently embedded into the published package artifact. This issue affects Gleam from 0.10.0-rc1 until 1.17.0.

Improper path validation vulnerability in the Gleam compiler's handling of git dependencies allows arbitrary file system modification during dependency download. Dependency names from gleam.toml and manifest.toml are incorporated into filesystem paths without sufficient validation or confinement to the intended dependency directory, allowing attacker-controlled paths (via relative traversal such as ../ or absolute paths) to target filesystem locations outside that directory. When resolving git dependencies (e.g. via gleam deps download), the computed path is used for filesystem operations including directory deletion and creation. This vulnerability occurs during the dependency resolution and download phase, which is generally expected to be limited to fetching and preparing dependencies within a confined directory. A malicious direct or transitive git dependency can exploit this issue to delete and overwrite arbitrary directories outside the intended dependency directory, including attacker-chosen absolute paths, potentially causing data loss. In some environments, this may be further leveraged to achieve code execution, for example by overwriting git hooks or shell configuration files. This issue affects Gleam from 1.9.0-rc1 until 1.15.3 and 1.16.0-rc1.