In OpenStack Glance through 32.0.0, the /v2/tasks API accepts type=import tasks that bypass import_filtering_opts, allowing an admin to fetch internal URLs from the Glance service network (aka SSRF), as long as https:// or http:// is used. This API has been available only to admins since Xena, and it has been deprecated for several releases.

Glance through 0.8.5 contains an IP address spoofing vulnerability in the authentication handler that allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass brute-force lockout protections by supplying arbitrary values in the X-Forwarded-For request header when the server proxied option is enabled. Attackers can manipulate the leftmost value of the X-Forwarded-For header to make each login attempt appear to originate from a distinct IP address, preventing the per-IP failed-login counter from reaching the lockout threshold and enabling unlimited credential guessing against the authentication endpoint.

OpenStack Glance <29.1.1, >=30.0.0 <30.1.1, ==31.0.0 is affected by Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). By use of HTTP redirects, an authenticated user can bypass URL validation checks and redirect to internal services. Only glance image import functionality is affected. In particular, the web-download and glance-download import methods are subject to this vulnerability, as is the optional (not enabled by default) ovf_process image import plugin.