File Browser before v2.63.22 fails to validate access rules for descendants during recursive copy, rename, and delete operations, allowing authenticated users to bypass path-based access controls. Attackers can copy, rename, or delete denied files by operating on their allowed parent directory, defeating rule-based isolation for confidentiality and integrity.

File Browser versions from 2.50.0 through 2.63.21 fail to validate JWT expiration when proxy authentication is configured with a non-default logout page. Attackers with a previously valid token can access protected routes and administrative endpoints indefinitely, and exchange expired tokens for fresh ones via the renewal endpoint.

filebrowser through 2.63.16 fails to properly restrict scope and permissions when self-signup is enabled with default CreateUserDir setting. Unauthenticated attackers can register accounts that inherit the server root scope with full create, modify, delete, rename, share, and download permissions, allowing unrestricted access to all files.

filebrowser versions before 2.63.19 contain an out-of-scope file deletion vulnerability in the TUS upload cache eviction mechanism that allows authenticated users with only Create permission to delete arbitrary files outside their scope. Attackers can swap an ancestor directory with a symlink during the cache TTL window to redirect the raw os.Remove call to an out-of-scope target, bypassing ScopedFs scope guards and Perm.Delete checks.

FileBrowser Quantum is a free, self-hosted, web-based file manager. Prior to version 1.3.2-beta, the `/api/auth/login` authentication endpoint does not execute in constant time. When a non-existent username is supplied, the server returns a `401`/`403` response almost immediately. When a valid username is provided, the server performs a bcrypt password comparison, causing a measurable delay in the response time. Version 1.3.2-beta patches the issue.

FileBrowser Quantum is a free, self-hosted, web-based file manager. Versions prior to 1.3.2-stable and 1.4.1-beta may leak some sensitive info, such as source and path. Versions 1.3.2-stable and 1.4.1-beta fix the issue. No known workarounds are available.

FileBrowser Quantum is a free, self-hosted, web-based file manager. Prior to version 1.4.3-beta, the `subtitlesHandler` endpoint (`GET /api/media/subtitles`) accepts two user-controlled query parameters: `path` and `name`, both of which are used in filesystem operations without sanitization, creating two independent path traversal vectors. The primary vector is the `path` parameter: it is passed directly to `idx.GetRealPath()` without calling `SanitizeUserPath()`, allowing an attacker to escape the storage root and set `parentDir` to any directory on the host. No existing anchor file is required. The secondary vector is the `name` parameter: it is joined with `parentDir` via `filepath.Join(parentDir, name)` without stripping directory components, allowing traversal relative to any resolved `parentDir`. Any authenticated user (regardless of role or permissions) can exploit either vector to read any text file readable by the server process, including `/etc/passwd`, SSH keys, database credentials, and JWT signing keys. Version 1.4.3-beta patches the issue.

File Browser is a file managing interface for uploading, deleting, previewing, renaming, and editing files within a specified directory. Prior to 2.63.17, File Browser builds new user scopes from usernames passed through cleanUsername() when Signup=true and CreateUserDir=true, but the many-to-one normalization can collapse usernames such as team/one, team one, and team-one to the same home directory without checking whether the resulting scope is already taken, allowing a second registrant to gain full read and write access to another user's files. This issue is fixed in version 2.63.17.

File Browser is a file managing interface for uploading, deleting, previewing, renaming, and editing files within a specified directory. From 2.63.6 to 2.63.16, File Browser's archive builder uses strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, "\", "/"), which turns a POSIX filename such as ..\..\evil.sh into the archive entry ../../evil.sh, allowing a user with upload permission to plant a backslash-named file that escapes the extraction directory when another user downloads and extracts the generated zip or tar archive. This issue is fixed in version 2.63.17.

File Browser is a file managing interface for uploading, deleting, previewing, renaming, and editing files within a specified directory. Prior to 2.33.8, when a shell interpreter is configured (e.g. /bin/sh -c), the command allowlist can be bypassed through shell metacharacters. The allowlist validates only the first token of user input, but the entire raw string is handed to the shell — semicolons, pipes, backticks, and $() all work to chain arbitrary commands after a permitted one. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.8.