BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to 1.5.0.rc3, a vulnerability has been discovered in BACnet Stack's file writing functionality where there is no validation of user-provided file paths, allowing attackers to write files to arbitrary directories. This affects apps/readfile/main.c and ports/posix/bacfile-posix.c. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.0.rc3.

BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to 1.5.0rc4 and 1.4.3rc2, a malformed WriteProperty request can trigger a length underflow in the BACnet stack, leading to an out‑of‑bounds read and a crash (DoS). The issue is in wp.c within wp_decode_service_request. When decoding the optional priority context tag, the code passes apdu_len - apdu_size to bacnet_unsigned_context_decode without validating that apdu_size <= apdu_len. If a truncated APDU reaches this path, apdu_len - apdu_size underflows, resulting in a large size being used for decoding and an out‑of‑bounds read. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.0rc4 and 1.4.3rc2.

BACnet Protocol Stack library provides a BACnet application layer, network layer and media access (MAC) layer communications services. In 1.4.2, 1.5.0.rc2, and earlier, an off-by-one stack-based buffer overflow in the ubasic interpreter causes a crash (SIGABRT) when processing string literals longer than the buffer limit. The tokenizer_string function in src/bacnet/basic/program/ubasic/tokenizer.c incorrectly handles null termination for maximum-length strings. It writes a null byte to dest[40] when the buffer size is only 40 (indices 0-39), triggering a stack overflow.