The Keycloak authentication manager in `apache-airflow-providers-keycloak` did not generate or validate the OAuth 2.0 `state` parameter on the login / login-callback flow, and did not use PKCE. An attacker with a Keycloak account in the same realm could deliver a crafted callback URL to a victim's browser and cause the victim to be logged into the attacker's Airflow session (login-CSRF / session fixation), where any credentials the victim subsequently stored in Airflow Connections would be harvestable by the attacker. Users are advised to upgrade `apache-airflow-providers-keycloak` to 0.7.0 or later.

JWT Tokens used by tasks were exposed in logs. This could allow UI users to act as Dag Authors. Users are advised to upgrade to Airflow version that contains fix. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.2.0, which fixes this issue.

The example example_xcom that was included in airflow documentation implemented unsafe pattern of reading value from xcom in the way that could be exploited to allow UI user who had access to modify XComs to perform arbitrary execution of code on the worker. Since the UI users are already highly trusted, this is a Low severity vulnerability. It does not affect Airflow release - example_dags are not supposed to be enabled in production environment, however users following the example could replicate the bad pattern. Documentation of Airflow 3.2.0 contains version of the example with improved resiliance for that case. Users who followed that pattern are advised to adjust their implementations accordingly.

The `access_key` and `connection_string` connection properties were not marked as sensitive names in secrets masker. This means that user with read permission could see the values in Connection UI, as well as when Connection was accidentaly logged to logs, those values could be seen in the logs. Azure Service Bus used those properties to store sensitive values. Possibly other providers could be also affected if they used the same fields to store sensitive data. If you used Azure Service Bus connection with those values set or if you have other connections with those values storing sensitve values, you should upgrade Airflow to 3.1.8

Before Airflow 3.2.0, it was unclear that secure Airflow deployments require the Deployment Manager to take appropriate actions and pay attention to security details and security model of Airflow. Some assumptions the Deployment Manager could make were not clear or explicit enough, even though Airflow's intentions and security model of Airflow did not suggest different assumptions. The overall security model [1], workload isolation [2], and JWT authentication details [3] are now described in more detail. Users concerned with role isolation and following the Airflow security model of Airflow are advised to upgrade to Airflow 3.2, where several security improvements have been implemented. They should also read and follow the relevant documents to make sure that their deployment is secure enough. It also clarifies that the Deployment Manager is ultimately responsible for securing your Airflow deployment. This had also been communicated via Airflow 3.2.0 Blog announcement [4]. [1] Security Model: https://airflow.apache.org/docs/apache-airflow/stable/security/jwt_token_authentication.html [2] Workload isolation: https://airflow.apache.org/docs/apache-airflow/stable/security/workload.html [3] JWT Token authentication: https://airflow.apache.org/docs/apache-airflow/stable/security/jwt_token_authentication.html [4] Airflow 3.2.0 Blog announcement: https://airflow.apache.org/blog/airflow-3.2.0/ Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.2.0, which fixes this issue.

Dag Authors, who normally should not be able to execute code in the webserver context could craft XCom payload causing the webserver to execute arbitrary code. Since Dag Authors are already highly trusted, severity of this issue is Low. Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.2.0, which resolves this issue.

When user logged out, the JWT token the user had authtenticated with was not invalidated, which could lead to reuse of that token in case it was intercepted. In Airflow 3.2 we implemented the mechanism that implements token invalidation at logout. Users who are concerned about the logout scenario and possibility of intercepting the tokens, should upgrade to Airflow 3.2+ Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.2.0, which fixes this issue.

Apache Airflow versions 3.0.0 through 3.1.8 DagRun wait endpoint returns XCom result values even to users who only have DAG Run read permissions, such as the Viewer role.This behavior conflicts with the FAB RBAC model, which treats XCom as a separate protected resource, and with the security model documentation that defines the Viewer role as read-only. Airflow uses the FAB Auth Manager to manage access control on a per-resource basis. The Viewer role is intended to be read-only by default, and the security model documentation defines Viewer users as those who can inspect DAGs without accessing sensitive execution results. Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.2.0 which resolves this issue.

Apache Airflow versions 3.0.0 through 3.1.7 FastAPI DagVersion listing API does not apply per-DAG authorization filtering when the request is made with dag_id set to "~" (wildcard for all DAGs). As a result, version metadata of DAGs that the requester is not authorized to access is returned. Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.1.8 or later, which resolves this issue.

Apache Airflow versions 3.1.0 through 3.1.7 missing authorization vulnerability in the Execution API's Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) endpoints that allows any authenticated task instance to read, approve, or reject HITL workflows belonging to any other task instance. Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.1.8 or later, which resolves this issue.