8.1 HIGH
- CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
- Attack Vector (AV): Network (N)
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
- Privileges Required (PR): None (N)
- User Interaction (UI): Required (R)
- Scope (S): Unchanged (U)
- Confidentiality (C): High (H)
- Integrity (I): High (H)
- Availability (A): None (N)
- Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Network (N)
- Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): Low (L)
- Modified Privileges Required (MPR): None (N)
- Modified User Interaction (MUI): Required (R)
- Modified Confidentiality (MC): High (H)
- Modified Scope (MS): Unchanged (U)
- Modified Integrity (MI): High (H)
- Modified Availability (MA): None (N)
Activity log
- Created suggestion
@nuxtjs/mdc: the URL sanitizer misses SVG xlink:href and data:text/html, allowing XSS from untrusted markdown at the default configuration
MDC is a tool to take regular Markdown and write documents interacting deeply with a Vue component. Prior to 0.22.1, @nuxtjs/mdc uses parseMarkdown with allowDangerousHtml enabled by default and relies on validateProps, validateProp, and unsafeLinkPrefix to remove executable URLs from untrusted Markdown. validateProp checks only attributes named href or src, allowing an SVG xlink:href value represented as xLinkHref to retain a javascript: URL that executes in the page origin when selected. The data:text/html denylist entries are also compared against url.protocol, which is only data:, so an iframe src containing data:text/html survives sanitization and executes in an opaque origin when loaded. Plain href javascript: URLs, srcdoc, object, script, and base elements are already blocked, making these two paths specific sibling gaps in the sanitizer. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.1.
References
-
https://github.com/nuxt-content/mdc/security/advisories/GHSA-mxm6-v9r6-r94c x_refsource_CONFIRMx_refsource_MISC
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https://github.com/nuxt-content/mdc/pull/491 x_refsource_MISC
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https://github.com/nuxt-content/mdc/releases/tag/v0.22.1 x_refsource_MISC
Affected products
- ==< 0.22.1
Package maintainers
-
@SuperSandro2000 Sandro Jäckel <sandro.jaeckel@gmail.com>
-
@pacien euxane <r9uhdi.nixpkgs@euxane.eu>