mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. From 2026.3.15 until 2026.6.4, mise loads github.credential_command from local project config before any trust decision, then executes that value with sh -c when resolving a GitHub token. An attacker who can place a .mise.toml in a repository can execute arbitrary shell commands when the victim runs a GitHub-related mise command and no higher-priority GitHub token environment variable is set. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.4.

mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. Prior to 2026.6.1, the mise HTTP backend builds its install symlink destination from the raw resolved version string for non-latest versions. Normal tool install paths use the sanitized version pathname, but the HTTP backend's symlink path uses the raw value. On Unix-like systems, if that version is an absolute path, PathBuf::join discards the intended mise installs root. A repository-controlled .tool-versions file can therefore make mise install create a symlink outside the mise install tree. With bin_path, the same issue can place an executable symlink under an attacker-selected absolute prefix, such as a developer-tool prefix that is later added to PATH. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.1.

mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. Prior to 2026.6.4, mise's trust feature gates config files (mise.toml, .tool-versions) through trust_check, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (mise-tasks/, .mise/tasks/, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task's tera fields — and that tera environment has exec() registered. A {{ exec(command='…') }} in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There's no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: mise tasks, mise task ls, mise run, mise tasks --usage (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to cd into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.4.