Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. From 2.73.0 until 2.91.0, he LaTeX backend's handling of \includegraphics, \input, and \include commands lacked path containment validation. Attackers could craft malicious LaTeX documents with path traversal sequences to read arbitrary files from the file system accessible to the process, include sensitive files in the converted document output, or potentially access configuration files, credentials, or other sensitive data This vulnerability is fixed in 2.91.0.

Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. Prior to 2.91.0, the EasyOCR model download functionality extracted ZIP archives without validating member paths, enabling Zip Slip attacks. If an attacker could compromise the model download source (via supply chain attack, DNS spoofing, or MITM), they could write arbitrary files to any location writable by the process, potentially achieving remote code execution by overwriting Python files or system binaries, persistent backdoors by modifying startup scripts or SSH keys, and data corruption or system compromise. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.91.0.

Docling simplifies document processing by parsing diverse formats and providing integrations with the generative AI ecosystem. From 2.13.0 until 2.74.0, the USPTO patent XML parser used the standard xml.sax.parseString() without protection against XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. An attacker could craft malicious USPTO patent XML files with external entity references that could read arbitrary files from the server filesystem, perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks, or cause denial of service through entity expansion (Billion Laughs attack). The vulnerability affects three USPTO patent format parsers: ICE (v4.x), Grant v2.5, and Application v1.x. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.74.0.