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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler() HT_caps_handler() iterates pIE->length bytes and writes into HT_caps.u.HT_cap[], which is a fixed 26-byte array (sizeof struct HT_caps_element). Because pIE->length is a raw u8 from an over-the-air 802.11 AssocResponse frame and is never validated, a malicious AP can set it up to 255, causing up to 229 bytes of out-of-bounds writes into adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info. Truncate the iteration count to the size of HT_caps.u.HT_cap using umin() so that data from a longer-than-expected IE is silently ignored rather than written out of bounds, preserving interoperability with APs that pad the element. An early return on oversized IEs was considered but rejected: it would bypass the pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1 assignment that precedes the loop, silently disabling HT mode for APs that append extra bytes to the HT Capabilities IE.
References
Affected products
- <225b6d3fc7e99ac3d20b6c861d1e47d24e7ea31d
- =<6.18.*
- =<6.12.*
- <37f642d47c3648a707df3ceb092eee1adffbfd28
- =<7.1.*
- <bb3b942da4123b55d1cacf19d1a7d5ba15dbf83a
- ==4.12
- =<6.1.*
- =<*
- =<6.6.*
- <8c872b47c7fc32e95e0da1db7512388794adcd69
- <918537a0fbed85aab61fa28ad75e6279070610c9
- =<5.15.*
- <6f91621fc45025ad3c0be796b70e6e4cee22fc69
- <4.12
- <f8001e1a516ba3b495728c65b61f799cbfad6bd0