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usb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm: bound altmode_desc[] per iteration in svdm_consume_modes() svdm_consume_modes() checks pmdata->altmodes against the array size once before the loop over the count, but forgot to check the bound at every point in the loop. In the well-behaved SVDM discovery flow this is harmless because each of at most SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX SVIDs contributes at most MODE_DISCOVERY_MAX modes, exactly filling altmode_desc[ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX]. But the CMDT_RSP_ACK handler in tcpm_pd_svdm() does not correlate an incoming ACK with any request the port actually sent. Once port->partner is set, an unsolicited Discover Modes ACK is consumed unconditionally. A broken or malicious port partner can therefore drive altmodes to ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX - 1 via the normal flow, and then send one extra Discover Modes ACK with seven VDOs. Because the pre-loop check passes, the loop could then writes up to five entries past altmode_desc[]. For mode_data_prime the next field in struct tcpm_port is the partner_altmode[] pointer array, which then receives partner-chosen SVID/VDO bytes. Move the bound check inside the loop so the array can never be indexed past ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX regardless of how many VDOs the partner supplies or how the function was reached.

Affected products

Linux
  • <845598b154b9a92e9d279fafafa9405c121ae805
  • =<6.18.*
  • <4.19
  • =<7.0.*
  • =<6.12.*
  • <3389c149c68c3fea61910ad5d34f7bf3bff44e32
  • =<*
  • <cbad85b446c06adbc5e5bed565871bb918ce9d32
  • <4505f33dab56c274e82f47f94bf60a8cbf8f4b42
  • ==4.19