6.5 MEDIUM
- CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
- Attack Vector (AV): Local (L)
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
- Privileges Required (PR): Low (L)
- User Interaction (UI): None (N)
- Scope (S): Changed (C)
- Confidentiality (C): High (H)
- Integrity (I): None (N)
- Availability (A): None (N)
- Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Local (L)
- Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): Low (L)
- Modified Privileges Required (MPR): Low (L)
- Modified User Interaction (MUI): None (N)
- Modified Confidentiality (MC): High (H)
- Modified Scope (MS): Changed (C)
- Modified Integrity (MI): None (N)
- Modified Availability (MA): None (N)
Activity log
- Created & dismissed (no matching packages found) suggestion
Network-AI: AgentRuntime sandbox path-prefix checks allow file access outside the configured base directory
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `AgentRuntime` promises scoped file access under a configured sandbox `basePath`, but its path containment checks use raw string prefix tests. A sandbox base such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox` also matches a sibling path such as `/tmp/network-ai-sandbox_evil/secret.txt`. An agent/user that can call `AgentRuntime.readFile()` or `AgentRuntime.listDir()` can read or list files outside the intended sandbox when the target path is in a sibling directory sharing the base path prefix. This breaks the documented sandbox boundary. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `SandboxPolicy.resolvePath()` and `isPathAllowed()` now use separator-anchored prefix checks (`resolved === base || resolved.startsWith(base + path.sep)`) for both the allow-list and block-list. A sibling directory that merely shares a name prefix (e.g. `/srv/app-evil` vs base `/srv/app`) is no longer treated as in-scope.
References
-
https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-jvcm-f35g-w78p exploitx_refsource_CONFIRM
-
https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2 x_refsource_MISC
Affected products
- ==< 5.12.2