8.8 HIGH
- CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
- Attack Vector (AV): Adjacent (A)
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
- Privileges Required (PR): None (N)
- User Interaction (UI): None (N)
- Scope (S): Unchanged (U)
- Confidentiality (C): High (H)
- Integrity (I): High (H)
- Availability (A): High (H)
- Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Adjacent (A)
- Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): Low (L)
- Modified Privileges Required (MPR): None (N)
- Modified User Interaction (MUI): None (N)
- Modified Confidentiality (MC): High (H)
- Modified Scope (MS): Unchanged (U)
- Modified Integrity (MI): High (H)
- Modified Availability (MA): High (H)
Activity log
- Created & dismissed (max. allowed matches exceeded) suggestion
mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(), llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data. They build a scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb's linear data area and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API (e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt). On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame(). The cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference counting. When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference. On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb's head has been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true). The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto operation. skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb's data area is not shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments, it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in place. This is the same pattern used by: - ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c) - MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c) - WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c) - TIPC (net/tipc/crypto.c) Without this guard, in-place crypto on shared skb data leads to: - Silent data corruption of other skb clones - Use-after-free when the crypto API scatterwalk writes through a page that has already been freed by another clone's kfree_skb() - Kernel crashes under concurrent 802.15.4 traffic with security enabled (KASAN/KMSAN reports slab-use-after-free) Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis.
References
Affected products
- <7a831bcd0486788283ef35e396d4282ee01bb0d5
- <e28e7fd34c449028325322a3f5127b92594b7396
- <bd968bdd568beacfdf98ec537a87527e85f1d0cf
- =<6.18.*
- <993fd674fe85d114e6a8d3963033d4fbbc2170a8
- <3.16
- =<6.12.*
- <84a04eb5b210643bd67aab81ff805d32f62aa865
- <86d531337ea1ba02d9f2bc830d07c683d9bfaade
- <3a2b378b3a9ca75d3518d879148d2ad25b5714a9
- =<6.1.*
- =<7.1.*
- =<6.6.*
- =<*
- ==3.16
- =<5.15.*
- <ff976ef7c39199ebff33c18034636595016db9f0
- =<5.10.*