7.1 HIGH
- CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
- Attack Vector (AV): Local (L)
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
- Privileges Required (PR): Low (L)
- User Interaction (UI): None (N)
- Scope (S): Unchanged (U)
- Confidentiality (C): None (N)
- Integrity (I): High (H)
- Availability (A): High (H)
- Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Local (L)
- Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): Low (L)
- Modified Privileges Required (MPR): Low (L)
- Modified User Interaction (MUI): None (N)
- Modified Confidentiality (MC): None (N)
- Modified Scope (MS): Unchanged (U)
- Modified Integrity (MI): High (H)
- Modified Availability (MA): High (H)
Activity log
- Created & dismissed (no matching packages found) suggestion
Network-AI: Poisoned environment backup manifest allows arbitrary recursive deletion during backup pruning
Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.listBackups()` reads each backup's `_manifest.json` and trusts the manifest's `path` field. `EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups()` later passes that trusted `entry.path` directly to `rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true })`. An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside `data/<env>/.backups/<name>/_manifest.json` can cause `network-ai env backup prune --env <env> --keep <n>` or any code path invoking `pruneBackups()` to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. This is fixed in v5.12.2. `pruneBackups()` no longer passes `entry.path` from the on-disk manifest to `rmSync`. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated `entry.backupId`, and a `dirname` containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. `"path": "/"`) is now inert.
References
-
https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-2fmp-9rvw-hc96 exploitx_refsource_CONFIRM
-
https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/releases/tag/v5.12.2 x_refsource_MISC
Affected products
- ==< 5.12.2