7.1 HIGH
- CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
- Attack Vector (AV): Local (L)
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
- Privileges Required (PR): Low (L)
- User Interaction (UI): None (N)
- Scope (S): Unchanged (U)
- Confidentiality (C): High (H)
- Integrity (I): High (H)
- Availability (A): None (N)
- Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Local (L)
- Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): Low (L)
- Modified Privileges Required (MPR): Low (L)
- Modified User Interaction (MUI): None (N)
- Modified Confidentiality (MC): High (H)
- Modified Scope (MS): Unchanged (U)
- Modified Integrity (MI): High (H)
- Modified Availability (MA): None (N)
Activity log
- Created & dismissed (no matching packages found) suggestion
Langroid: Path traversal in the file tools allows read/write outside configured current directory
Langroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Prior to version 0.64.0, Langroid's `ReadFileTool` and `WriteFileTool` appear to treat `curr_dir` as the intended working-directory boundary for file operations. However, the tools only change the process working directory to `curr_dir` and then operate on the user-supplied `file_path` without resolving and enforcing that the final path remains inside `curr_dir`. As a result, a tool caller can supply path traversal sequences such as `../secret.txt` to read files outside the configured current directory, or `../written_by_tool.txt` to write files outside that directory. This can impact applications that expose Langroid file tools to an LLM agent, user-controlled tool call, or delegated coding/documentation agent while relying on `curr_dir` to restrict file access to a project/workspace directory. Version 0.64.0 patches the issue.
References
-
https://github.com/langroid/langroid/security/advisories/GHSA-fg23-3346-88f5 exploitx_refsource_CONFIRM
Affected products
- ==< 0.64.0