7.8 HIGH
- CVSS version (CVSS): 3.1
- Attack Vector (AV): Local (L)
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
- Privileges Required (PR): None (N)
- User Interaction (UI): Required (R)
- Scope (S): Unchanged (U)
- Confidentiality (C): High (H)
- Integrity (I): High (H)
- Availability (A): High (H)
- Modified Attack Vector (MAV): Local (L)
- Modified Attack Complexity (MAC): Low (L)
- Modified Privileges Required (MPR): None (N)
- Modified User Interaction (MUI): Required (R)
- Modified Confidentiality (MC): High (H)
- Modified Scope (MS): Unchanged (U)
- Modified Integrity (MI): High (H)
- Modified Availability (MA): High (H)
by @LeSuisse Activity log
- Created suggestion
- @LeSuisse accepted
- @LeSuisse published on GitHub
Stanza: Zip Slip Path Traversal in Model/Resource Extraction
Stanza is a Stanford NLP Python library for tokenization, sentence segmentation, NER, and parsing of many human languages. Prior to 1.14.0, stanza.resources.common.unzip in stanza/resources/common.py passes downloaded model and resource archives to zipfile.ZipFile.extractall without validating member paths, and the vulnerable extraction path is reachable through stanza.download and stanza.install_corenlp. A malicious archive containing parent-directory traversal entries can write outside the intended model directory, allowing files writable by the Stanza process to be overwritten and potentially enabling code execution through modified shell configuration, SSH authorization data, Python packages, or executable scripts. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.0.
References
-
https://github.com/stanfordnlp/stanza/security/advisories/GHSA-2fwf-f686-7p34 exploitx_refsource_CONFIRM
-
https://github.com/stanfordnlp/stanza/releases/tag/v1.14.0 x_refsource_MISC
Affected products
- ==< 1.14.0
Matching in nixpkgs
pkgs.python313Packages.stanza
Official Stanford NLP Python Library for Many Human Languages
pkgs.python314Packages.stanza
Official Stanford NLP Python Library for Many Human Languages
Package maintainers
-
@riotbib lennart <lennart@cope.cool>
-
@Stebalien Steven Allen <steven@stebalien.com>